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Definition of Terms and concepts 
Kebele: - neighborhood associations, which are the smallest unit of local government in 
Ethiopia.  
Wereda: - It is the lowest level of official administration in Ethiopia next to kebele. It is 
approximately equivalent to a district in other countries.  
Farmer: - the small scale land owner who resides in the rural area and leads his life by    
Agricultural activities like producing crops, plant trees, or maintain livestock in his/her plot. 
Conflict: - is the disagreement or dispute between/among individuals resulting in disruption of 
production. 
Rural land: - is the agricultural and non-agricultural land that is important to the livelihood of 
the land holder in the area he/she is residing. The land is used to produce crop or suitable to 
maintain livestock. Rural land includes a large scale land provided for investors and small scale 
land provided for peasants. But, rural land in this paper means small scale lands preserved to the 
farmers residing in the area to plough and produce crops, plant trees, build houses or maintain 
livestock. It is both the agricultural and non-agricultural land that is important to the livelihood 
of the farmer in the area he/she is residing. 
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Abstract 
The study has attempted to assess the role of Local Governance in Rural Land Conflict Management 
in relation to Transparency and Accountability. The general objective of this study is to assess and 
understand the role and contribution of the local land governance structures and institutions to the 
management of the diverse rural land conflicts.  Both qualitative and quantitative approaches were 
used for the study by making one supplementing the other. The study assessed the role of local 
governance in rural land conflict management by using 136 households who had experienced 
conflicts in the last two years. Four Kebeles with high prevalence of rural land conflicts were 
purposively selected from the total of 20 Kebeles of Ganta Afeshum wereda. Moreover, focus group 
discussion and interview were also employed to collect the qualitative data. It was found that most of 
the land cases are managed formally even though the preference of the litigants was the informal or 
the customary one as it reduces time and money, maintains the relationship of litigants, and it is 
believed by the rural community that the customary one is a win-win to both litigants. It is also an 
important means of consensus building approach. The study also showed that unclear land provision 
scheme is the main sources of conflicts. Boundary conflict is found as the main type which is 
occurred frequently. Transparency and accountability are used to measure the local land governance 
as indicators, and it was found that both indicators are at their minimal level. Land Governance 
structures and institutions at local level are not supportive enough to the rural community in terms of 
reaching the poor and the marginalized group. The governance structure was found weak, non-
participative, biased to the rich and not inclusive as the individuals working with in the structure are 
incapable, inexperienced and corrupted ones. Gap in enforcement of land laws, unclear land 
provision schemes by the government, unclear land entitlement procedures, and low coverage of the 
land governance structures and institutions are the major challenges of the local land governance 
that possibly could result in rural land conflicts. Hence, to minimize problems related to land 
governance the structures and institutions should increase their coverage besides to equipping it with 
educated, capable, experienced and motivated manpower through providing trainings and other 
motivating factors like allowances, salary increments, recognition etc. This might enhance the 
transparency and accountability of these institutions. Customary way of conflict management should 
be considered in the legal conflict management systems to easily manage conflicts before cases are 
filed in the legal system. This reduces time, money and other resource to the community with a 
significant level. Hence, the livelihood of the rural community will be enhanced to a better level. 
Key words: Transparency, Accountability, Local Governance, Land, Conflict, Conflict Management 
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Chapter one: Introduction 
1.1. Background of the Study 
Globalization and the information revolution are motivating a large and growing number of 
countries around the globe to reexamine the roles of various levels of government and their 
partnership with the private sector and civil society. These reforms typically involve shifting 
responsibilities to local governments and beyond government providers, with the objective of 
strengthening local governance. This movement has generated a large interest in learning from 
the history of nations as well as from current practices across countries on local governance 
(Shah, 2006). 
Governance is the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the 
management of a country’s affairs at all levels (World Bank, 2007), and is a neutral concept 
comprising the complex mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and 
groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights and obligations, and mediate their 
differences (Palmer et al, 2009).  
UNDP (2007) has defined the broader concept of local governance as the formulation and 
execution of collective action at the local level. Thus, it encompasses the direct and indirect roles 
of formal institutions of local government and government hierarchies, as well as the roles of 
informal norms, networks, community organizations, and neighborhood associations in pursuing 
collective action by deﬁning the framework for citizen-citizen and citizen-state interactions, 
collective decision making, and delivery of local public services. Thus, Local governance is 
beyond the local government (FAO, 2007). 
 Local governance, therefore, includes the diverse objectives of vibrant, living, working, and 
environmentally preserved self-governing communities (World Bank, 2008). 
The very concept of ‘good governance’ at local levels denotes quality, effectiveness and 
efficiency of local administration and public service delivery; the quality of local public policy 
and decision-making procedures, their inclusiveness, their transparency, and their accountability 
in land governance; and the manner in which power and authority are exercised at the local level 
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as Anwar shah, (2006) noted in his literature that explains the exercise of local governance in 
Developing countries.  
Land is an asset that has different definitions as to its unique property. According to USAID, 
land is “a unique, valuable, and immovable resource of limited quantity and is a central element 
in the varied and complex social relations of production and reproduction that requires proper 
and sustainable governance…..’’ (USAID, 2009:34). 
Land is at the center of social, economic and political life in most of African countries (USAID, 
2009) and, it is also seen as an important economic asset and source of livelihoods that is closely 
linked to community identity, history and culture as noted in Zwan, (2010). Holding of land in 
most societies is an indication for the wealth status of a society and governments of a specific 
country (Zwan, 2010). From the power it gives to owners in terms of economic wealth (Zwan, 
2010) and its ability to grant access to land, Rural Communities can readily mobilize around land 
issues, making land as their central agenda (UNDP, 2008). Moreover, Land issues readily lend 
themselves to conflict. 
Moreover, holding of Land is not such an easy task in a populous society. It requires a power to 
own it. This power to own the land may lead to conflicts between the societies (USAID, 2009). 
Some empirical literatures also reveal that land scarcity or abundance affects territorial disputes 
at the micro level (World Bank, 2004). There are two thoughts justifying land scarcity has two 
way of implication. One line of thought goes back to Thomas Malthus and neo-Malthusians that 
see population growth leads to land scarcity and hence land degradation as potential sources of 
violent conflicts (ibid). Another view states that land scarcity leads to intensification, technical 
and institutional innovation, including ways to resolve conflicts in a better way (FAO, 2007).  
According to the United Nations Environmental program, wider processes of political exclusion, 
social discrimination, and economic marginalization across a society could also be factors that 
exacerbate land conflicts (UNEP, 2007).  
Thus, conflict is an attendant feature of human interaction and cannot be eliminated; however, its 
proper management and transformation are essential for peace and progress in human society 
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(Posen, 1993). That is why conflict resolution is one of the serious challenges of governance and 
as a result, legitimacy of conflict management and resolution mechanisms is critical. 
Adequate approaches of land conflict management are required for peaceful political, social, and 
economic use of land. However, of the commonly used conventional technical approaches- 
Negotiation, Arbitration, Conciliation and Mediation- are not adequate to address these issues 
(UN-habitat, 2007). Part of the reason is that existing land administration tools are not able to 
cope with even current challenges (ibid). Many excellent land policies, laws and technical 
reforms have been developed, yet, in many cases, implementation has slipped, stalled, or has 
even been reversed (Palmer, D. et.al, 2009). 
Therefore, sound land governance is fundamental in achieving sustainable development and 
poverty reduction by managing rural land conflicts by establishing sound land governance 
(UNDP, 2007). 
Sound land Governance requires operational processes to implement land policies in 
comprehensive and sustainable ways. Many countries, however, tend to separate land tenure 
rights from land use opportunities, undermining their capacity to link planning and land use 
controls with land values and the operation of the land market. These problems are often 
compounded by poor administrative and management procedures that fail to deliver required 
services (FAO, 2007). 
Land related conflicts need critical scrutiny of the problem and implementing measures related to 
good land governance which is of a technical, procedural and political nature (Kironde, 2009). 
This is because rights over land cannot be separated from civil, political and human rights, and 
are dependent on political, administrative and professional readiness to ensure fair treatment and 
equal opportunities (World Bank, 2008). 
Weak land governance to the reverse is a cause of many land-related problems, and attempts to 
address land related problems are affected by the quality of land governance (Palmer et al, 2009). 
However, in the other way, improving land related systems, such as land tenure arrangements 
could often improve land governance by minimizing the land conflicts to be emerged (UN 
habitat, 2007). 
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1.2. Statement of the Problem 
In the era of globalization and population pressure, land scarcity is the notorious element in 
Africa for the increasing number of land conflicts. Besides, the current land systems in Africa 
may not be well-equipped to resolve such conflicts (Cotula, et. al, 2004; van Donge, 1999). 
Hence, whether it is at the heart of a conflict or gets dragged into it, land requires a careful 
approach by policy makers because it is a central element in the evolution of societies (Pons-
Vignon, 2004). 
Thus, Good Governance at local level has been an important topic of research because of the 
ever existing unresolved land conflicts, and good governance is seen as one entry point for 
conflict management (Bigdon, 2003).  
Most of the discussions on good governance are customarily focused on the macro level 
(Bigdon, 2003) and there is still a lack of focus on good governance at local level especially in 
conflict prone-rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2004).  
Though, the government of Ethiopia has made a clear distribution of power between the Wereda 
and Regional administrations as part of its good governance reform (Tigray region five years 
regional growth and transformation plan from 2010/11 - 2014/15 (2011) and implemented ADLI 
in all regional states to enhance rural development through good governance at local level, it 
relatively lacks effectiveness and efficiency (Ethiopia’s agricultural sector policy and investment 
framework 2010-2020, 2010).   
Thus, there are major knowledge gaps regarding the question of what makes rural governance 
structures and institutions work effectively for small-scale, resource-poor farmers, women-
headed households, and other vulnerable social groups in Ethiopia (Spielman et al, 2008). The 
same is true for Tigray as it could not be unique from the Ethiopian context.  
Tigray is one of the regional states with scarcity and degradation of arable land in which the 
settlement of the population and its topography exacerbates the need for more arable land as 
80.5% of the population is rural dweller (The five years regional growth and transformation plan 
2010/11 - 2014/15, 2010). 
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Ganta-Afeshum is the most densely populated Wereda having residents of 361.4 people per 
single square kilometer, and 96% of the people are living in rural areas with a total population of 
190,066 in an area of 525.93 square kilometers. The size of land per house hold is 0.5 hectare 
which is less than the national and regional averages that are 1.01 and 0.51 hectares respectively 
(CSA 2008). As a result, land related court cases are higher when compared to other court cases 
from regional up to the local level. It is about 35.67%, 65% and 80% at regional, wereda and 
kebele level respectively in the year 2010/11 as noted in Gizachew, (2011).   
Furthermore, according to the three consecutive years annual wereda aggregate report of Ganta 
Afeshum land Administration and use desk with in the office of Agriculture and Rural 
Development, the number of land related conflicts are soaring from 83 in 2009/10 to 217 and 
222 in 2010/11 and 2011/12 respectively at kebele level and from 138 in 2010/11 to 176 in 
2011/12 at wereda level without including the conflicts that are solved customarily.  
Therefore, this study mainly aims at diagnostically assessing and understanding the roles and 
structures (institutions and procedures) of local governance in rural land conflict Management in 
relation to Transparency and Accountability, and the content of the rural land conflicts in Tigray 
and specifically in Ganta Afeshum wereda. 
1.3. Research Questions 
This study has tried to answer the following research questions: 
 How are rural land conflicts managed at local level? 
 What are the main causes of rural land conflicts  
 What are the main and frequently emerging rural land conflict types?  
 What is the status and trend of rural land governance in terms of Transparency and 
Accountability? 
 How do local governance structures and institutions affect rural land conflict 
management? 
 What are the challenges of rural land governance at local level? 
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1.4. Objective of the Study 
The objective of the research is to assess and understand the role and contribution of the local 
land governance structures and institutions to the management of the diverse rural land conflicts 
in relation to Transparency and Accountability. So, it mainly focuses on:   
 Diagnostically assessing how rural land conflicts are managed at local level  
 Identifying the main causes of rural land conflicts 
 Identifying the main and frequently emerging rural land conflict types 
 Assessing the status and trends of rural land governance in terms of Transparency and 
Accountability 
 Assessing how do local governance structures and institutions affect rural land conflict 
management, and 
 Identifying the main challenges of rural land governance at local level 
1.5. Scope and Limitation of the Study 
This study mainly focuses on how rural land is governed and the role of local land governance in 
rural land conflict management at local level. Geographically, the study covers Ganta Afeshum 
wereda of Eastern zone in the national regional state of Tigray, and findings and conclusions 
drawn from this research may not represent or correspond to other weredas of the region, and 
may not give the picture of the whole region.  
Transparency and Accountability are the only two dimensions used to measure local land 
governance at local level with regard to the government land appropriation schemes, land 
entitlement procedures, procedures for inheritances, availability of land information, access to 
land information, standardized procedures for determination, and recording and dissemination of 
information on land related issues and responsiveness of land governance structures and 
institutions when demand arises, availability of mechanisms for questioning and explaining the 
ongoing land activities in the community, the involvement of the community in every land 
related issues and have a say on it and participation of the community on electing and firing 
when necessary the kebele land administrators and land judges. So that, it enables the researcher 
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to easily assess the role of local land governance in rural land conflict management. Other local 
governance dimensions are beyond the scope of this paper.  
The study is only limited to assess and understand the contents of the local governance structures 
and institutions and their role in the rural land conflict management. It does not show the cause 
and effect of rural land conflicts on the community. 
1.6. Significance of the Study 
This study may contribute to the recent discourse on how rural land governance is going, and the 
role of rural land governance in conflict management at local level. Besides, it could offer the 
necessary information to better understand structures (procedures and institutions) of the local 
governance system in Ganta Afeshum wereda, and it may also provide interested researchers the 
necessary background and inspire them to conduct further studies on such related issues. 
Moreover, it could render additional information to interested bodies and policy makers on their 
way to deal with it. 
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Chapter two: Literature Review 
2.1. Local Governance 
Local governance comprises a set of institutions, mechanisms and processes through which 
citizens and their groups can articulate their interests and needs at the local level (UNDP, 2004). 
Good governance enables to enhance and maintain the social, cultural, political, and economic 
elements of a community. The building blocks of good local governance are citizen participation, 
partnerships among key actors at the local level, capacity of local actors across all sectors, 
multiple flows of information, institutions of accountability, and a pro‐poor orientation (ibid). 
 
Of the various hierarchical administrations of one country’s political system, Local governance 
is considered as one part which is administered by the authorities who are subordinate to the state 
authority (Humphries R. (1998). Nevertheless, the subordinates are elected independently of 
control by the state authority by qualified persons resident, or having property in certain 
localities, which localities have been formed by communities having common interests and 
common history (ibid). 
 
When we see Local governance from the legal point of view 
“…..Local government may be said to involve the conception of a territorial, non-
sovereign community possessing the legal right and the necessary organization to 
regulate its own affairs. This in turn, presupposes the existence of local authority 
with power to act independent of external control as well as the participation of 
the local community in the administration of its own affairs” (B. Havenga (2002) 
in Robson (1937). 
 
Irrespective of the above definitions, Local governance emphasizes the need to look beyond the 
narrow perspective of legal frameworks and local government entities. It seeks to include the 
multiplicity of formal and informal relationships between different actors in development (Olsen, 
2007) that shape and influence the output and effectiveness of political and administrative 
systems at a sub‐national level.  
 
9 
 
According to UNDP (2004), Good local governance is not just about providing a range of local 
services but also about preserving the life and liberty of residents, creating space for democratic 
participation and civic dialogue, supporting market-led and environmentally sustainable local 
development, and facilitating outcomes that enrich the quality of life of resident. 
These days, governance does not only indicate a central state in the development discourse but it 
is perceived as an important element to be included in development strategies (Zimmermann, 
2006). The discourse of governance and its emphasis is generally affected by the policy 
objectives and the context within which it is being applied. According to FAO (2007), 
governance is seen from how officials and public agencies acquire and exercise power and 
authority to determine public policy and provide public goods and services, for those who see the 
view of governments restricted to how the state serves its citizens on one hand. On the other 
hand, for those who see authority and power in society vested in many institutions, governance 
reflects the role of the private sector and civil society in decision making alongside that of the 
government. Simply put "governance" means the process of decision-making and the process by 
which decisions are implemented (UN-ESCAP, 2009).  
In the civil society, governance reflects cooperation between civil and political societies and 
between the state and its citizens (Roy, 2008). Hydén and Mease (2004) further elaborate on 
governance as “the formation and stewardship of the formal and informal rules that regulate the 
public realm, the arena in which the state as well as economic and societal actors interact to take 
decisions”. In this paper, the researcher used FAO (2007) governance definition since it has all 
the components of transparency and accountability of governance that the research is also 
interested with. Thus, Governance is the process of governing: 
    “It is the way in which society is managed and how the competing priorities of interests of 
different groups are reconciled. It includes the formal institutions of government but also 
informal arrangements for achieving these ends. Governance is concerned with the process by 
which citizens participate in decision-making, how government is accountable and transparent 
to its citizens, how society obliges its members to observe its rules and laws”. 
Good governance therefore is related to the way important decisions are made by the society, 
organizations or groups of persons and it encompasses the choice of persons to participate in 
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such decision-making as well as who and how to render accounts of the entire process and 
stewardship.  “Good governance is perhaps, the single most important factor for eradicating 
poverty and promoting development” according to the former UN Secretary General Mr. Kofi 
Annan as cited in (UNDP, 2004). Since land is one of the four basic factors of production (i.e. 
land, labor, capital and entrepreneurship) and characteristically fixed in supply, it requires 
maximum attention through prudent governance practices as it is at the center of eradicating or 
alleviating of poverty and promoting development (UN-Habitat, 2007). 
2.2. Land and Governance 
In most developing countries where agriculture is the main economic activity, land is considered 
as the only means of existence of a given society. This is due to the fact that Land is not only the 
most basic aspect of subsistence for many people around the world; it can also contain valuable 
structures and natural resources on it (USAID, 2005). Land is therefore, a very strategic socio 
economic asset particularly in poor societies where wealth and survival are measured by control 
and access to land (ibid). Moreover, Land is a central element in the varied and complex social 
relations of production and reproduction in human life of most of the developing countries, 
especially in the Sub Saharan region (OECD 2004).  
 
Furthermore, Land is the single greatest resource in most countries. People require land and 
related resources such as forests and water for the production of food and to sustain basic 
livelihoods (FAO, 2007). Besides, Land provides a place for housing and cities, and is a basic 
factor of economic production as well as a basis for social, cultural and religious values and 
practices (UN-Habitat, 2007). Access to land and other natural resources and the associated 
security of tenure have significant implications for development as World Bank (2004) noted. 
The land rights of the poor and vulnerable are increasingly affected by climate change, violent 
conflicts and natural disasters, population growth and urbanization, and demands for new energy 
sources such as bio-fuels. Besides, Seventy-five percent of the world’s poor live in rural areas 
and most are involved in agriculture. In the 21st century, agriculture remains fundamental to 
economic growth, poverty alleviation, and environmental sustainability. Therefore, land 
governance remains at the center of all the issues (Deininger et.al. 2012). 
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World Bank, (2004) explained land governance concerns and manners as “Land governance … 
concerns the rules, processes and structures through which decisions are made about the use of 
and control over land, the manner in which the decisions are implemented and enforced, and the 
way that competing interests in land are managed” (FAO ,2007).  
Land governance, by extension, encompasses statutory, customary and religious institutions, as 
well as informal institutions (FAO, 2007). It includes state structures such as land agencies, 
courts, ministries, and municipalities responsible for land (UN habitat, 2007) as they are the 
stakeholders in land related administrations regardless of the location. It also includes informal 
land developers and traditional bodies. It covers the legal and policy framework for land, as well 
as traditional practices governing land transactions, inheritance and dispute resolution. In short, it 
includes all relevant organizations from the political bodies, civil society and private sectors 
(Asia land forum, 2012). 
2.3. Land Conflict Management 
Within any jurisdiction, whether it is a community or a country, there are multiple development 
objectives and multiple stakeholders who have interests that range from basic survival to 
personal enrichment to societal well-being (Palmer, D. et.al, 2009). As these all objectives rely 
directly or indirectly on land ownership, land is a decisive asset which needs a critical scrutiny 
and governance.  
Since land resources are finite within a jurisdiction, control over land rights is a means of 
accumulating and dispensing political and economic power and privilege through patronage, 
nepotism and corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa (Yamano, 2005). As a result, it is increasingly 
becoming a source of conflicts as there is often competition between stakeholders over access to 
and use of the resources. Neighbors dispute the position of their boundary, with both claiming 
the land. Farmers and pastoralists compete to use the same land (Palmer, D. et.al, 2009).  
Consequently, competition over access and use of land may breed a conflict across individuals 
and groups of a community. Alongside this, when symbolically or emotionally important land or 
property is at issue, chances of conflict and violence increase significantly (USAID, 2005). Thus, 
addressing land conflict issues are critical to improving governance at the specific area (Kironde, 
2009). 
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Basically as it is not easy to distinguish a conflict on rural land from disputes over rural land, 
trying to differentiate the two every now and then is a matter of indifferent to some land 
literatures (Babette, 2008). 
 
Various authors have suggested different definitions regarding conflict and disputes of rural land. 
For example, Mulatu in M.Abdo (2009:117) defined as Land Conflict, scope wise can be 
extended from disagreement to armed confrontations where competing interests and claims have 
caused or threatened a breakdown in ordinary or even peaceful coexistence whereas disputes are 
associated with distinct justifiable issues which require a solution, can be managed. 
 
Babette (2008:87) has also defined rural land conflicts as a social fact, in which at least two 
parties are involved, the roots of which is difference in interest over the property right to land. 
On top of this, the right to use the land, to manage the land, to generate an income from the land, 
to exclude others from the land, to transfer it and the right to compensation for it are sources of 
rural land conflict (D. Todorovski, 2011).  
 
Thus, Conflict is an inevitable and pervasive aspect of human life. It occurs between two 
individuals, groups, organizations, communities and nations and even two regions in the form of 
disagreement, grievances, problems and tensions (Khanal, 2002). So, resolving conflict is a 
prime concern of the present-day social, economic and political complexity. By extension, this 
poses a question of when and how the conflict is resolved since a delay in addressing conflicts 
may lead to severe instabilities in the community and henceforth the political system of a given 
society. As Khanal addressed, a normal course of conflict turns violent if no action is taken to 
transform or manage it through a natural course of action. The existence of these conflicts and 
the failure of political machines to address them in time have created more gaps in the society, 
which ultimately has hindered the political development of the country, thus, it requires an 
effective conflict management mechanisms (ibid). 
 
The term conflict management has come into frequent use in connection with the local 
governance. The local government institutions and the people living at this level face varieties of 
conflicts in their day to day affairs. The identification, classification and resolution of these 
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conflicts are very important at this stage if political development along with other kind of 
development is to take place (D. Todorovski, 2011). Thus proper local land governance is critical 
for identifying the main sources of these conflicts in order to have an effective and efficient rural 
land conflict management (Khanal, 2002). 
 
Land conflict management had been given less focus even though there are increasing incidences 
of land conflicts at local level (FAO, 2007). Previous studies on this topic have also been limited 
to some specific occurrences that are related to large-scale civil strife or politically motivated 
conflicts (Deininger and Castagnini, 2005). A recent study in Ethiopia, however, shows that rural 
households experience small-scale land conflicts with relatives, neighbors, landlords, or local 
governments, and that such small-scale conflicts may have significant impacts on their 
agricultural productivity (Yamano, 2005). Besides, Gizachew (2011) noted that rural land 
conflicts at local (wereda and kebele) level are 65% and 80% respectively in Tigray regional 
state. And, this shows that how much effective and efficient land conflict management is critical 
in the region. According to FAO, (2007), there are two types of land conflict management 
methods: the formal/legal and the informal/customary methods, and the researcher took these 
methods from the FAO (2007) hand book as the main benchmarks to assess the land conflict 
management in the area. 
2.3.1. The Formal Conﬂict Settlement Methods and its Limitations 
Under the constitutions in force in many African countries, courts and tribunals are the 
institutions responsible for the settlement of land conﬂicts. The judge has the legal power to give 
land related decisions to the litigants as put in their existing land laws (FAO, 2007). In theory, 
the settlement of land conﬂicts through legal procedures has many advantages— impartial 
procedures, enforcement of a clearly and previously established rule of law and a clearly deﬁned 
penalty, professionalism of judges (ibid). 
However, the judiciary is blamed for the enforcement of rules that are uniform and thus seldom 
adapted to the diverse local conditions. A legal procedure necessarily results in the recognition of 
a “loser” and a “winner”, which is not easily accepted among rural communities in the countries 
(UNDP, 2007). This is true in many of the African countries. The impartiality of the procedure is 
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sometimes called into question, in view of frequent accusations related to corrupt practices 
within the judiciary (ibid). 
Furthermore, courts and tribunals are overcrowded with land conﬂict cases, a situation that 
reﬂects the limited effectiveness of the judicial system. Besides, justice is not accessible for the 
poor, due to the costliness of procedures, bureaucratic red tape and limited coverage of the 
national territory by the judiciary. Even when parties seeking redress at the courts succeed in 
overcoming these procedural and cost obstacles, the judge’s decisions may not be sometimes 
properly understood or meet the expectations of litigants, and this makes litigants to stay away or 
remain silent and rely on the customary way of conflict management (UN Habitat, 2009). 
Such ﬁndings and the need to better secure rural stakeholders’ land titles in general are the 
factors that motivated the increasing interest in alternative land tenure conﬂict management 
mechanisms (ibid). 
2.3.2. Alternative Conflict Management Methods 
According to FAO, (2007), alternative conﬂict management methods are consensus-building 
processes for conﬂict settlement. These methods were designed to make up for the previously 
identiﬁed weaknesses of the judicial system. Indeed, they are meant to manage the conﬂict on the 
basis of common interests and through the identiﬁcation of convergence points. They are easily 
accessible and cheaper, and thus affordable by rural populations. Such alternative conﬂict 
management approaches are particularly suitable for rural contexts, where the most important 
thing is less the determination of who is right than the preservation of the public interest and 
local solidarity, while keeping everybody’s honor safe (ibid). 
Key Alternative Conﬂict Management Methods 
Various methods are adopted as alternative ways of managing conﬂicts. The major ones 
according to FAO, (2007) are: 
 Negotiation: The basic principle of consensual negotiations is that the parties are the main 
actors; they identify their own needs and interests, and agree on mutually advantageous 
solutions. Negotiation demands much collaboration and is based on the assumption that 
the parties have the goodwill needed to communicate during the entire process. It allows 
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for solutions that may be more satisfactory and easily applicable, as the parties in conﬂict 
develop these solutions themselves. 
 Mediation: In the process of mediation, the parties also play a role, but they are supported 
by the facilitation services of a third party called mediator. Mediation is a process of 
voluntary consultation between conﬂicting parties that is managed by one independent 
third party or more who facilitate communication and try to help the parties’ ﬁnd a 
solution themselves. For such a method to be successful, the parties must adhere to a set 
of common values, which makes it reasonable to expect the parties’ compliance with the 
agreement. The settlement of the conﬂict should ensure the restoration of interpersonal 
relations and preserve the “good reputation”, or the image, of the parties. Indeed, the need 
to avoid “losing face” is crucial for the conﬂicting parties, as shown by several studies. 
 Conciliation: Here as well, a third party is involved, i.e. the conciliator. The key within this 
alternative conﬂict management method consists of the conciliator’s function in 
reconciling the initially diverging positions of the conﬂicting parties. The main difference 
with mediation is that the conciliator makes proposals to help ﬁnd a solution to the 
problem, which may then be recorded in writing. 
Limitations of Alternative Conﬂict Management Methods 
There are some similarities between the methods described above and the customary conﬂict 
management approach as implemented so far by communities and their leaders. These traditional 
options have proved effective as people deemed them “ﬁt for them” and, above all, because 
traditional authorities were able to enforce decisions. However, the local administrative and 
institutional framework in most of the African countries has changed signiﬁcantly, especially 
under the inﬂuence of decentralization and with the emergence of new types of stakeholders who 
have weakened traditional authorities (UNDP, 2004). 
It seems more relevant to institutionalize customary regulations in the national legal procedure as 
a prerequisite for the parties in conﬂict, before appealing to the judge as this are very important 
to minimize time and other resource wastages (Transparency international, 2007). This has been 
the case in Niger and to a lesser extent in Burkina Faso (ibid). Such an option involves 
controlling customary institutions concerned in order to prevent the often reported cases of 
abuse. Alternative conﬂict management is often blamed for failure to settle all types of land 
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conﬂict, especially those involving parties whose power and inﬂuence differ radically (UNDP, 
2004). This is also true of the structural inequalities and glaring injustices against disadvantaged 
groups which can be resolved only through more far-reaching political or legislative reforms. 
Finally, the non-binding nature of alternative conﬂict management methods can make solutions 
unsustainable in the long run (FAO, 2007). 
2.4. Types and Sources of Land Conflict 
Conflict over land may vary based on different circumstances according to the nature of land use 
(Ubik, 2008). Catula et al., (2004) raised different factors of land conflict in Africa, and 
explained it as follows 
              “A major factor underlying land disputes in Africa is linked to the large flows of people 
seeking land where they can settle and farm. Relations between incomers and the indigenous 
inhabitants are often tense. With few common social and cultural values shared. Uncertainties 
regarding the rights of different groups are aggravated by the plurality of laws and systems of 
regulation for control of land. When land starts to become scarce and hence valuable and 
marketable, such uncertainties generate fears and suspicion between neighbors and even within 
families. Government interventions and establishment of agricultural projects and commercial 
farm enterprises add further elements of instability to land relations. While high demographic 
pressure and land shortage are important dimensions of land conflicts, they are not sufficient to 
explain how and why completion for land flares in to violent clashes”. 
Thus, various scholars provide different causes and types of land conflict, especially rural land 
conflicts. The possible causes of rural land conflicts are: weak and ineffective enforcement of 
institutions, scarce land resource, poverty, inheritance, boundary, Government land appropriation 
schemes, some one’s intention over political difference, and unfair land distribution (Ubik, 
2008). The types of the land conflicts are emanated from the sources, such as; Land Scarcity and 
Degradation, Unfair land distribution, weak and ineffective enforcement of institutions, Poverty 
and population growth, Boundaries, Inheritances are some of the common types that needs a 
sustainable land conflict management mechanisms as noted in Yoder et al., (2003). 
 
17 
 
2.5. Dimensions of Land Governance 
As noted in OECD, (2008), good governance could be assessed using the following Good 
Governance for Local Development dimensions. Such as; Representation, Participation, 
Accountability, Transparency, Effectiveness, Security, Equity (OECD, June 2008). 
For the purpose of this study Transparency and Accountability dimensions are used to assess the 
land governance at local level as these are the two decisive dimensions mostly used by many 
scholars and organizations to assess local governance of all agendas (Asia land forum, 2012). 
2.5.1. Transparency in Land Governance 
Land remains a highly complex and contentious issue, involving economic, social, political, 
cultural and often religious systems demanding a transparent land administration (FAO, 2007). 
Transparency is a critical component of a well-functioning land administration, in particular in 
view of the scarcity of clear and credible information on land availability and transactions, and 
the poor dissemination of public information on land rights and policies. The risk of corruption 
and inequalities are very real in land allocation and management if there is no transparent 
governance (Transparency international, 2004). So that, the consequences to the poor often take 
the form of difficult access to land assets, unawareness of land policies and legal frameworks, 
ignorance about land transactions and prices, misallocation of land rights, land grabbing and 
abuse. When in place, transparency can encourage civic engagement and stakeholders’ 
accountability by rendering the public decision making arena more accessible. This in turn 
strengthens confidence in government and public agencies, and has a positive economic impact, 
also on GDP. Many of the general governance principles related to transparency thus appear 
highly relevant to the land administration field (UN habitat, 2008). 
Transparency in local land governance can be described in the form of the availability of Land 
information, open access to information about ownership, value and use of land, standardized 
procedures for determination, recording and dissemination of information, supervision and 
possibility of appeal (Van der Molen, 2007). The availability of information on land 
administration can reduce the possible occurrence of corruption and promotion of transparency 
on the other end. Besides, since Bribery, fraud and nepotism occur in an environment of secrecy, 
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information availability minimizes the occurrence of these hindrances from effective land 
governance (Transparency international, 2004). Transparency is also best served when the public 
at large has the constitutional right to access the information at any time and without restrictions 
regarding the object of interest. Land information being open for public inspection, provides 
effective opportunities to monitor illegal land sales and land grabbing (ibid). 
Standardized Procedures for Determination, Recording and Dissemination of Information are 
also useful for the reason that it is impossible to change land registers and holdings in a hidden 
and legally unrecognized way where transparency is indicated by. Furthermore, Openness not 
only prevents corruption (Mwanza, 2004) but also a system of public and corporate audits will 
reveal illegal manipulation of the registers (ibid).  
 
2.5.2. Accountability in Land Governance 
As FAO, (2007), defined, Accountability means demonstration of stewardship and is cited as 
important for reducing bribery and corruption. Accountability combines with transparency in the 
discourse of good governance as they both emphasize the necessity for institutions to make their 
activities open to their clients (Schultz, 2008). Included in these dimensions are all the factors 
that make customary tenure institutions accountable of their stewardship to community members, 
reporting on what they have been entrusted to do, responding to questions, explaining actions 
and providing evidence of their performance (FAO, 2007). Factors like the frequency of 
interaction with community members, feedbacks, and record keeping are important to measure 
accountability in customary tenure institutions. On the other hand, customary authorities must 
report regularly on what they have been delegated to do by responding to questioning, explaining 
actions and providing evidence of their functions (Transparency international, 2007). 
The responsiveness of the land governance  structures and institutions as demand arises from the 
community, the availability of mechanisms for questioning and explaining the ongoing land 
activities in the community, The community’s involvement in every land related issues and have 
a say on it,  and  the participation of the community in electing and firing of the kebele land 
administrators and land judges at kebele level are the points used to assess the level of 
accountability of local land governance and its role in rural land conflict management as these 
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factors are used to measure the level of accountability in many of the governance issues at local 
level (UN habitat, (2008). 
2.6. Challenges of Land Governance 
The need for good governance in Land Administration is undeniable as is influenced by 
increasing incidences of tenure insecurity and land conflicts (Bell, 2007).  
Similarly, Zimmermann (2006) reported that millions of women around the world suffer abuses 
of their equal rights to own, inherit, manage and dispose of land. According to Zimmermann, 
efforts to recognize women’s rights in land have been met with formidable resistance because of 
patriarchal control in land tenure. Furthermore, Bell (2007) noted that illegal grabbing of land 
has also become a common practice in most of the developing countries. The land of vulnerable 
ethnic minorities is grabbed to enable illegal or government-sanctioned concessions to proceed. 
The rich and powerful people in society claim land of others, thereby causing land disputes and 
conflicts (Mathieu, 2006). These challenges have been attributed to weak governance in the 
various institutions in charge of administering land in a given community or locality (Magel and 
Wehrmann, 2001; Zakout et al., 2007). Particularly, nowadays, Land governance activities have 
been associated with bribery and corruption, especially in the developing world and specifically 
in the sub Saharan Africa (Van der Molen and Tuladhar, 2007).  
Poor remuneration of civil servants (Bell, 2007), is the main contributing factors to bribery and 
corruption besides to lack of rule of law (Zimmermann, 2006). Bribery and corruption tend to 
benefit power holders - political elites and government officials more than the poor and 
vulnerable groups as the poor is always damaged when there is corruption and bribery (Bell, 
2007; Van der Molen and Tuladhar, 2007). 
Furthermore, weak governance has been linked to lack of comprehensive regulatory framework 
governing security of tenure, insufficient or incoherent and improperly enforced legal provisions, 
lack of transparency and access to information, inequity and unfairness, lack of accountability, 
irresponsiveness of institutions to the demand of land users and inability for citizens to 
participate in land governance (UNDP, 1997; UN-Habitat, 2004; UNHS and Transparency 
International, 2004; UNDP, 2006; FAO, 2007; UN-Habitat, 2007). 
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In many societies, access to land or natural resources is seen as a key element of cultural identity. 
People are unable to play a full part in society without secure land rights, citizenship is restricted 
and exclusion grows. The more people are unable to conform to official norms and procedures as 
sometimes enacted through land and property rights, the more their status is undermined. 
Excluding large sections of the population from legally secure access to land generates 
alienation; it also discourages respect for the rule of law, which can surface in various forms of 
anti-social behavior, with the costs and problems involved like social instability, land conflict 
(FAO, 2007). 
Social problems associated to inequitable distribution of land and associated economic 
opportunities tend to lead to demands for as it is at the center of every social issue in every given 
community (Zimmermann, 2006), and Land Governance is more difficult when land and related 
natural resources are scarce and unmet demand is great. Where these are not met, social conflict 
or political violence and instability may ensue.  
It has become clear that, in conflict situation, socially accepted tenure arrangements and 
practices seem to prevail over statutory systems. This can be exemplified internal conflicts where 
historical grievances can lead to large scale internally displaced people (FAO, 2007). 
Ubik,(2007) also noted that contested access to land and natural resources has also been a factor 
underlying armed and violent conflicts and territorial disputes in many African countries. In 
many fragile States of Sub-Saharan Africa, skewed access and inequitable distribution of natural 
resources have been used by “rebel groups‟ for territorial disputes and power challenges. This 
has been the case in the Delta region of Nigeria with various groups maintaining conflicts on the 
basis of oil distribution as noted in (ibid).  
These cases go to demonstrate that poorly governed natural resources can lead and fuel land 
conflicts. The inequity amongst various interest groups (including customary land holders) could 
be used by (opportunistic) interest groups including political elites to perpetuate conflicts. 
Understanding where and who have the power and control over land and its resources is 
therefore is critical. Similarly, gaining clarity around various power centers and their motives 
and engaging various interest parties in the management of land and their resources could reduce 
the incidence of conflicts (UN-habitat, 2009). 
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For people living in Sub-Saharan African countries, access to land or natural resources is seen as 
a crucial element of cultural identity (UN- Habitat, 2008). Secure land rights for all, not only for 
a few will ensure that each member of the society plays in part in society and use land for the 
desired purpose. The more people are unable to conform to official or formal norms and 
procedures, the more their status is undermined.  
Excluding large sections of the population from legally secure access to land generates 
alienation; it also discourages respect for the rule of law, which can surface in various forms of 
anti-social behavior, with the costs and problems involved. In Africa in particular, social 
problems linked to inequitable distribution of land and associated economic opportunities tend to 
lead to demands for land reform. Where these are not met, social conflict or political violence 
and instability may ensue (UNDP, 2007).  
Thus, prudent land governance is very important to address the challenges raised around land in 
many circumstances after knowing exactly the main ones (UN- Habitat, 2007). Therefore, the 
following are the main challenges of land governance; 
I. Access to land and security of tenure 
Tenure insecurity problems in customary land are complex and may stem from many sources. 
Commonly among them are loss of usufructs rights, forced eviction, divorce, and 
disenfranchisement as a result of cross cultural marriage between matriarchal and patriarchal 
families which leaves children without inheritance rights. But, nowadays, land is legally 
redistributed to citizens, though there is a land scarcity everywhere in the world (Mahama and 
Dixon, 2006). 
Thus, indigenous members of customary areas could access land through the lineage system 
while non-community members access land through grants of various forms in many of the 
African countries (Ubink, 2007; Zakout et al., 2007).  
II. Access to information and services 
Access to land information and services is a very important factor that needs to be addressed in 
land governance (FAO, 2007). Sometimes it might not be difficult to establish access. However, 
22 
 
the quality of information to be accessed is always questioned. In some occasions, land delivery 
is oral and in many customary areas, there are no structures for proper documentation, 
maintaining and recording land information. Even where information is kept, it is distorted and 
disorganized, mostly in the hands of individuals, thereby making it difficult to obtain 
comprehensive and up-to-date information on land allocation and dispute resolution (Ubink, 
2007). 
III. Distribution of community resources 
Rights in customary land exist to protect all interest groups in the land owning groups, and are 
the responsibility of customary leadership to ensure that the proceeds from communal land are 
equitably distributed among all community members (Ikejiofor, 2006). With land becoming 
short in supply as a result of urbanization, population pressure, gender and intergenerational 
equity has become a challenging issue in customary tenure systems (McEwan, 2003). The 
question is whether the customary systems as they exist today have strategies that protect 
different groups of today and the generations to come, and therefore, there should be a fair and 
equitable distribution system of the community resources (ibid). 
IV. Abuse of power and stewardship by the customary leaders 
The object of customary land governance is that land is vested in groups whose leader is 
entrusted with the responsibility of administering their land for and on behalf of the entire group 
(Ubink and Quan, 2008). Chiefs and heads of families, clans and tribes are not in any way 
permitted to take any unilateral decision concerning the acquisition or occupation and use of land 
or the utilization of resources emanating from the land. This structure of customary systems 
should make customary tenure institutions accountable to local people because of strong kinship 
ties (Clement and Amezaga, 2009).  
However, several authors suggest that accountability in customary tenure systems diminishes 
especially where these customary mechanisms for holding chiefs accountable have collapsed 
(Toulmin, 2009). Under such conditions, customary authorities abuse the power vested in them 
by exhibiting opinions showing that they no longer hold a fiduciary position (Kasanga and 
Kotey, 2001). For example, Ubink (2008) reports that in Ghana, some chiefs assume complete 
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ownership responsibility, and display tendencies to adopt landlord-like positions with regard to 
customary land. They take unilateral decisions and in many cases the activities concerning the 
land are executed without the knowledge of the community members (Ubink and Quan, 2008). 
Some chiefs and headmen abuse their responsibilities by allocating large tracks of land to 
themselves or their associates, especially individuals who provide them with money, beasts, 
alcohol and material goods and services (Mugyenyi, 1988). In such areas, chiefs’ administrative 
roles in land right transactions enable them to appropriate community members’ interests for 
purely economic motives. 
V. Land conflicts 
Although there is no immediate data available (UN-Habitat, 2007), land conflicts exist in many 
areas of sub Saharan Africa. The main sources of conflict in these areas are uncertainty of 
boundaries or allocation of the same piece of land to more than one person. Uncertainty of 
boundaries occurs when the land marks by which the real boundaries are defined no longer exist. 
These conflicts can be linked to many factors like improper documentations, weakening 
customary tenure institutions, transparency, and their structures for accountability and 
stewardship, manipulation of customary laws, land grabbing and tenure insecurity (WB, 2008). 
2.7. Context and Nature of Rural Land Conflicts and its 
Management: International Experience 
2.7.1. Rural Land Conflicts and Its Management in East Timor 
 
 Rural Land Conflicts 
The recent political transitions and governance practices gave rise to the layered land claims that 
traditional leaders and the local government confront today. The types of conflicts which 
traditional authorities and local government address, in various capacities, can be characterized 
as follows according to Yoder et al., (2003). 
Inheritance conflicts 
Many rural land disputes among individuals arise from conflicts over inheritance and division of 
parental land.  Cases involving natural and adopted children are usually resolved by traditional 
24 
 
leaders at the family or village level in accordance with local customs of inheritance that vary 
widely among regions.  Customary decisions in inheritance disputes frequently divide the land 
between the parties or require both parties to divide harvest or products of the land, as sharing 
the land is viewed as one means of preserving a harmonious family relationship.  In most 
instances, adopted children cannot inherit land, unless the parents have made clear provision for 
this.  In most but not all cases involving disputes between brothers and sisters, traditional 
settlements favored the male descendant, in accordance with norms of land inheritance and 
ownership.  In the absence of parental division of land among children, daughters were usually 
awarded land when they were still unmarried at the time of settlement.  Some land inheritance 
cases that traditional authorities could not resolve included disputes between the adopted 
children and the siblings of a deceased family member, when both sides claimed rights to the 
land and the customary mechanism for inheritance was unclear. 
Intra-lineage conflicts 
Conflicts over use of agricultural or residential land among members of a lineage group are 
variable in frequency, but their resolution by traditional means is relatively unproblematic.   
Within the rural Timorese social structure as yoder et al., (2003) explained, a unified identity 
among members of a lineage and the authority of elders within a family remain strong.  
Disputants and traditional authorities considered cases in this category to be common, minor 
problems, and most are solved quickly and finally by family elders without taking them to 
outside levels for settlement (ibid).  Where an individual has planted annual crops on another’s 
field without permission, the settlement frequently requires the parties to divide that year’s 
harvest and not repeat the action.  Government authorities find intra-lineage land cases complex 
to resolve: communally-held land is difficult to settle because of the number of individuals 
involved, an incomplete understanding of the internal mechanisms of inheritance, and the need 
for decisions made about ancestral land to be accepted by all members of the lineage. 
Customary or ancestral claims versus current-use or improvement claims 
Different individuals and groups are often involved in disputes where both parties base their 
claims on customary mechanisms for establishing land rights through use, but appeal to different 
time periods: one group claims an inherited right, usually because ancestors farmed that land or 
modified it with tree-planting, or irrigation, while the other party claims rights based on recent 
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use and continuing improvements to the land.  In this regard, at least one party would not hold a 
formal land certificate to the land in question.  Several on-going conflicts between current land 
users and those claiming the same sites as ritually important or sacred land are also included 
here. 
While customary leaders recognize the underlying strength of customary landholdings, older 
ancestral claims do not automatically take precedence in settlement outcomes in these cases.   
Yoder et al., (2003) also put that traditional authorities found in favor of those who had more 
recently used the land, making significant improvements to the property, against a customary 
claim based on long-ago, and short-term use without leaving permanent evidence.  He also added 
that, as to both traditional and government figures involved, these types of disputes are among 
the most difficult cases to settle either with interim or final agreements (ibid).   
Village or district boundaries 
There are many disputes about community or individual boundaries in areas with and without 
resettlement, but as this matter concerns both customary claims and state governance, traditional 
leaders are rarely able to reach a binding resolution, and most current cases have been suspended 
pending national guidelines on structures of local governance as these are an ever existing 
conflicts (Yoder et al., 2003). 
Land conflicts as one manifestation of political differences 
Traditional authorities have been managing politicized issues of land since long before the 
advent of national-level government structures in rural areas of Timor and these traditional 
authorities are frequently called to assist in these types of cases, and both the government 
officials and the traditional authorities agreed that politically grounded land conflicts are among 
the most intractable conflicts they ever face, with some stating that such cases are impossible to 
solve.   
Abandoned, vacated, and absentee ownership of land 
Vacating significant tracts of land that has been classified as abandoned as to Yoder et al., (2003) 
are significantly exposed to ownership conflicts as land is nowadays a scarce resource 
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Several locations reported that most of the people currently using vacated land are young 
families from among the local residents who did not have their own land in East Timor (Yoder 
et. al., 2003). 
 
Conflict Management Methods by Traditional and Local Government Authorities 
When rural land conflicts arise, it is the responsibility of conflicting parties to seek assistance 
from traditional leaders; traditional authorities in all regions agreed that they did not first 
approach conflicting parties when they heard of a conflict.  Local authorities set a time and place 
for conflict resolution, call witnesses, and sometimes make site visits to contested land (UNDP, 
2007).  If the case is unresolved, a wider circle of witnesses may be called. Besides oral 
testimony of conflicting parties and witnesses, other essential forms of evidence to land claims 
include trees, terraces, irrigation, fences, rock markers, paths and earthen divisions between rice 
fields (ibid).   
Local leaders usually called disputants together within 1-2 weeks of the request to assist in 
settlement, and most cases were settled within one month (FAO, 2007). Sometimes they hear a 
case from morning until night.  Small cases can often be settled by the local leaders within the 
space of several hours (Yoder et. al., 2003). Thus, elements of settlement processes that could be 
termed mediation, conciliation, and arbitration varied widely among traditional authorities (FAO, 
2007). A few insisted that an arbitrated decision was the sole responsibility of the traditional 
authority, and that disputants had no choice but to accept and obey the decision, but most 
indicated that disputants played more active roles in reaching agreements, proposing solutions, 
and setting compensation (ibid). 
 As noted in Yoder et al., (2003), some traditional leaders described their role as that of mediator, 
moderating a discussion between the disputing parties, who optimally come to their own solution 
to the conflict. He also explained that government supports the local leaders use arbitration when 
the fault or answer is clear, but mediate when a solution requires negotiation or both parties have 
committed wrongs according to their custom (FAO, 2007).  Frequently, decisions made by 
disputants, traditional leaders, and local government representatives are additionally 
strengthened through formal recognition by a local ritual authority (Yoder, et. al., 2003). 
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Compensation and land division in dispute settlements 
Regarding compensation, negotiation is used for numbers and types of animals that would be 
paid; the local leaders decide fines by considering the animals owned by the person to pay the 
fine, tailoring to the individual’s ability to pay (UNDP, 2007). 
 Following the procedure of settling land disputes with minimal government involvement, some 
traditional leaders’ first attempt to mediate cases, only resorting to arbitration when initial efforts 
at conciliation fail.  In some cases, disputants themselves reached an agreement, but in the final 
process of drawing boundaries the traditional facilitator assumed the role of authoritative 
arbitrator to “legitimize” the parties’ decision and thus increase the gravity of the agreement as 
binding (Yoder et al., 2003). 
For disputes within families, the contested land is often divided in to equal halves; the reason 
given is that sharing the land will allow for good relationships among family members as both 
sides benefit from the settlement. The local leaders visit the contested land and publicly divided 
it, usually placing or confirming visible boundaries, disputes rarely recurred (Yoder et. al., 
2003). 
Reconciliation or continuation of a case 
A common feature of all rural land conflict settlements is a reconciliation ceremony that signifies 
and seals the end of the dispute.  Even cases that have been settled with government mediation or 
court decisions must return to this traditional practice to be finally resolved and restore the 
relationships (UNDP, 2007).   
When conflicting parties cannot reach resolution or do not accept the arbitrated decision of 
traditional authorities, sometimes the dispute settlement is suspended until the parties are willing 
to attempt another agreement (FAO, 2007). When a conflict is unresolved and needs to advance 
to a higher level, both traditional and government authorities frequently place restrictions on 
farming or harvesting tree crops from the disputed land until a decision is reached (Yoder et. al., 
2003). 
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2.7.2. Transparency and Accountability of Local Land Governance in 
Macedonia 
The involvement of all relevant stakeholders with responsibility and/or power for tackling 
corruption has a key role to play while designing a transparent system. This involvement of 
relevant stakeholders was instrumental in securing their ownership of the assessment process and 
of the data to be generated, and in ensuring uptake of results in local policy-making (Manila, 
2003). 
Users of public services, including citizens and CSOs, and other relevant stakeholders should 
also be consulted in the process of designing the instrument, to identify corruption “hot spots” 
based on their experience and perceptions of corruption and Macedonia did the same while 
developing its system as explained in Nahem, (2008). Such inputs by citizens in the design phase 
allows for the instrument to have a focus on poverty and gender, through the identification of 
corruption hot spots of particular relevance to the poor, women and vulnerable groups. Citizens’ 
participation also enhances the potential for the assessment to serve as an effective accountability 
mechanism between local governments and their constituencies (ibid). 
Although there is not a universally agreed definition of corruption, UN habitat defines corruption 
as 'the misuse of office for private gain' (UN Habitat, 2004).Corruption can be expressed in terms 
of Bribery, fraud, Favoritism, Nepotism, and Clientalism, and is used as a measure to 
transparency of the local land governance in Macedonia. 
It is obvious that Corruption has a negative effect on the gear of a development of any given 
nation, but, it has the most devastating effect in developing countries because it hinders any 
advancement in economic growth and democracy (UNDP, 2004). However, it is possible to 
minimize the magnitude of corruption if there is properly established transparent and accountable 
land governance in the local administration of a given community. 
 
2.7.3. Land Conflicts and Resolution Mechanisms in Cambodia 
Cambodia, with over 80% of its population still working in the agricultural sector, a majority 
being subsistence farmers, is a good example for a country where the handling of land as a 
source of rapid income, a means of speculation and a sign of gratitude for those loyal to the 
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government, have clearly gotten out of control (Wehrmann, 2006). With about 80% of the 
country’s population working in the agricultural sector, land in Cambodia is one of the most 
valuable natural resources and forms the basis for most of the Cambodian people’s livelihood. In 
fact most people in Cambodia declare that land is the foundation of society and life of the 
country (ibid). 
Land ownership and access to land are today the most frequent source of conflict in the rural as 
well as the urban parts of Cambodia. At the source of the current struggles is the country’s 
conflict- ridden past as well as its current political situation (Land Grabbing & Poverty in 
Cambodia, 2009): While the “democratic system of checks and balances - among state, political 
society and civil society institutions - exists on paper only.” The extremely hierarchical systems 
of power, together with high levels of corruption, have given rise to an arbitrary system of land 
acquisition and speculation by those in power. In addition, the “absence of an independent 
uncorrupted judicial system has meant that effective legal remedies for victims of forced 
evictions are unattainable” (Land and Housing Working Group, 2009). 
Increasing land value, ineffectiveness of law enforcement, lack of community’s knowledge in 
legal and policy matters, and unclear roles and responsibilities of key responsible authorities are 
in part the driving forces leading to land conflicts in Cambodia (FAO, 2007). Statistically as 
reported in the NGO Forum (2009), in total an estimate of the year 2005 stated that 1 in 15 
families in Cambodia were involved in a land conflicts ( Wehrmann, 2006). An NGO report on 
land disputes that arose during the year 2008 counted 173 officially filed disputes, each 
involving between 5 and 4000 families. The claimed land was either residential, farm or paddy 
land and those accused by the claimants of having tried to grab it were government authorities in 
23.4 percent of the cases, the military in 20.6, and companies in 29.9 percent of the cases (NGO 
Forum, 2009). 
Thus, the Government is not only failing in its obligations to protect against forced evictions, but 
Government authorities are often actively involved in illegal land-grabbing” (NGO Forum, 
2009). As a result, villagers will generally attempt to have a powerful administrative decision 
maker intervene on their behalf, following the existing decision making framework in which the 
more powerful figure within the administration can “override a decision of a subordinate.” 
According to WB, (2006), usual help is sought from several authorities at different levels, though 
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in the majority (87%) of the cases arising in 2008, the complaint was submitted first to 
immediate local authorities (at the village, communal or district level). In about 49% of the 
cases, the complaint was referred to the Provincial governor and in nearly one third of the cases 
the complaint was sent directly to the Prime Minister’s cabinet. While provincial courts also 
received around one third of the complaints, there were strikingly few cases where complaints 
were submitted to the actual institutions in charge of land dispute settlement: the district, 
provincial or national cadastral offices or the National Authority for Land Dispute Resolution 
(NGO Forum, 2008).  
This is explained by several factors, the first being an apparent lack of clarity on the 
responsibility of the institutions mentioned. Theoretically the Cadastral Commission has 
jurisdiction over land disputes involving untitled land; the courts are responsible for those where 
land titles exist. The second influencing factor is the fact that the formal institutions are not 
trusted among villagers, on the contrary, they are generally perceived as “costly, time consuming 
and biased toward the rich” ( Wehrmann, 2006). 
In fact, a World Bank, (2008) study from the year 2006 showed that in 22% of the studied cases 
presented to the Cadastral Commission, bribes or other informal fees had been paid. In those 
cases dealt with by the court the figure rose to 68-100%. 
The high costs are one reason why many land disputes never reach the courts; most villagers 
simply lack the resources to pay for an official complaint. As a result, human rights- as well as 
development NGOs have increasingly begun to actively get involved in land dispute resolution 
processes on behalf of the poor and marginalized. Almost no cases are reported, in which NGOs 
did not play a prominent role as watchdogs, advocates, legal consultants or even by submitting 
complaints on behalf of the victims (NGO Forum, 2008).  
Equally unsatisfactory as earlier numbers, are the figures relating to the resolution of land 
disputes. From the cases studied for the year 2008, only about 12, 5 % were solved within that 
year, while other studies have shown that the process of dispute settlement can take up to ten 
years (Schwedersky, 2010). 
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Table 2.1: Status of Land Conflict Settlement in Cambodia in 2008  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cambodia NGO forum 2009 
2.7.4. Land Conflict Management in Burundi 
Land is a contested issue in Burundi. Since 1972, conflicts about land have exponentially 
multiplied, and nowadays about 80% of conflicts appearing in court are about land (ICG 2003). 
Inequitable access to land, spoliation by the authorities, and a confused land tenure system are 
further compounded by a high population density and degradation of the land (FAO, 2007). 
In the communities, a huge variety of conflicts around land exists, ranging from disputes within 
families about the division of the inheritance, or the limitations of plots, to those resulting from 
the occupation of land by displaced people, or about land-use between cultivators and 
pastoralists (UNDP, 2004). 
The level and scale of the conflicts around land pose huge challenges to conflict resolution 
institutions as noted in the UNDP, (2007). As a result, Legislation on land is inadequate, 
difficulties arise between the customary and ‘official’ system to administer land conflicts, and 
the judicial system is not equipped to deal with the task placed upon it (FAO, 2007).  
Therefore, the need to strengthen conflict resolution mechanisms to deal with land disputes is 
apparent. The Bashingantahe (locally notable leaders), or other institutions within the 
communities (such as the Commissions Justice & Paix of the Catholic Church) have started their 
own structures to minimize the chronic land conflicts in Burundi (Transparency international, 
2007). 
Status percentage 
Partly resolved 5.20% 
Fully resolved 12.72% 
Not resolved yet… 82.08% 
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Conflict Management at Community Level 
To solve their disputes around land, people in the communities in Burundi may address two 
systems for conflict resolution: the customary system of the Bashingantahe, and the juridical 
system of the state. While the former relies in the first place on conventions and customary 
regulations, the latter bases itself on the legislation of the state (UNDP, 2004). Apart from those 
systems, people may approach representatives of local authorities, or structures established by 
NGOs or churches, to amicably arrive at a resolution of their disputes, or to acquire consultation 
on how to proceed in the conflict management system (ICG 2003). The level of involvement, the 
reliability and the capacities of these several institutions vary from location to location (ibid). 
Informal Mechanisms 
The Bashingantahe 
Customarily, disputes around land tenure in Burundi were being mediated by the Bashingantahe 
(Council of Notables). It is composed of most respected community members (ICG, 2003). Its 
traditional roles is to settle local disputes, to reconcile individual persons and families, to 
authenticate all sorts of contracts (such as marriage, inheritance, sales, and gifts), and to 
represent the local population at higher level. The Bashingantahe also had to oversee the 
maintenance of truth and justice, to ensure the security of life and property, and to provide 
guidance and balance to politicians in the exercise of their mandates (FAO, 2007). 
As Yoder et al., (2003) noted the council’s institutional strength is getting weakened and eroded 
by the Political practices under the period from 1987-1992. Despite its weaknesses, however, 
many Burundians, local and international organizations consider its revitalization as very 
important (ibid).  
The Juridical System  
For a civil case to appear before the Tribunal of the locality, the litigant first needs to pass to the 
Bashingantahe at his/her community. If one of the conflicting parties does not agree with the 
solution proposed by the Bashingantahe, he can submit it to the Tribunal of the locality, after 
receiving a note from the Bashingantahe, including their conclusions on the case. The Tribunal 
of the locality does not necessarily need to take notice of the decision by the Bashingantahe. 
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Nonetheless, the Bashingantahe may be asked to testify or provide further explanations on the 
case. In case the Tribunal of the locality makes a field visit to identify the particularities of a 
disputed land property, the Bashingantahe are asked to be present as witnesses. If parties cannot 
come to agreement before the Tribunal of the locality, their case may be transferred to the Court 
of Appeal at province level (Dexter 2005). 
                The Relationship between the State and Customary Systems 
While in their judgments the Bashingantahe rely in the first place on conventions and customary 
regulations, the juridical system of the state bases itself on the legislation of the state. All land 
conflicts should first pass before the Bashingantahe. Only in case those are unable to find a 
resolution, conflicts are passed on to the state legal system. This is advantageous in that the 
Bashingantahe are more familiar with the local context of a conflict and might thus decide in a 
more fair and win-win way (FAO, 2007). 
Women and Land Rights in Burundi 
Until today, customary law prevails for inheritance issues. Under customary law of Burundi, 
married women are excluded from inheriting land from their father, as long as there are any other 
male descendants (van Leeuwen, 2005). Women are supposed to have access to land through 
marriage: a woman will get use rights to the land belonging to her husband. This implies no 
ownership, and the land remains the property of her family in law (Kamungi et al. 2004). If a 
woman is not married and still stays in the paternal home at the time of her parents’ death, after 
settling her brothers, she may use for her subsistence a portion of land for as long as she is alive. 
If she gets any children, they will inherit property only in the line of irregular successors or they 
will inherit nothing at all (ibid). 
2.8. Local Land Governance in Rural Land Conflict Management in 
Ethiopia and Tigray 
There is unprecedented interest in decentralized systems of governance in many African and 
other developing states. A number of them have established constitutionally entrenched system 
of local governance (WB, 2004). 
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Ethiopia, like other developing states, is in a process of implementing a decentralization 
program. The decentralization process began in 1991 when the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Front (EPRDF) came to power as Ayele, (2008) noted. In 1995 a new Constitution was 
promulgated which formally established the country on a federal basis with a federal government 
at the center and nine ethnically defined regional state at the periphery. The 1995 Constitution, in 
addition, laid the foundation for further decentralization by requiring the regional states to 
establish and adequately empower local government (FDRE Constitution, 1995). 
The objectives that underpin the creation and empowerment of local government, as envisaged in 
the Constitution are, to enhance public participation, ensure the provision of efficient service 
delivery and accommodation of ethnic minorities (FDRE Constitution, 1995). The regional states 
of the country, therefore, have a constitutional obligation to create adequately empowered local 
government (Z. Ayele, 2008). 
Historic events have influenced land policy in Ethiopia. Following the overthrow of the imperial 
regime of Haile Selassie by the Derg in 1974, the major programs of land reform and 
nationalizing were introduced. The Derg also prohibited the renting out of land, and other 
transactions (sales, mortgages, sharecropping) were severely restricted. Nationalization was 
followed by redistribution of land through Peasant Associations within communities, and also 
resettlement from the highlands. After the fall of the Derg in 1991, the new federal government 
drafted a constitution (Deininger et al., 2008). 
The constitution assigned legislative power over land to the federal level of government and 
reserved implementation of federal land laws to the States, which was reinforced by a Federal 
proclamation in 1997 (updated in 2005). Land remains public property, and the prohibition of 
sales and exchanges was also continued or restricted, but renting out of land was now allowed. 
The last massive land distribution took place in the mid-1990s, but this practice ended with the 
introduction of land certification programs. 
This decision However, the hope for landless people to access land in their home areas remained 
unanswered. Resettlement programs are still in place but now voluntary and mostly within the 
State towards the lowlands or forest land (Z.Ayele, 2008). 
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2.8.1. Land Tenure Forms and Tenure Security 
The nationalization of land in 1975 led to the extinguishing of previously existing (customary) 
rights to land in the highlands, but not in the lowlands. Elements of customary tenure are still in 
use for allocating and managing grazing and forest lands. 
Institutional land governance framework 
The Ministry of Agriculture and rural development –MOARD- is responsible for coordinating 
land issues. Each Regional State has its own institutional arrangement for land administration. 
For example, in Amhara Regional State, the Bureau of Environmental Protection Land 
Administration and Use is responsible for land administration; regional Environmental 
Protection Land Administration and Use Authority in Tigray; Bureau of Land and Environmental 
Protection in Oromia, and Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development in Southern Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples. Ethiopia is discussing a revision of the institutional structure for land 
administration systems (Z. Ayele, 2008). 
In rural areas, land administration and the daily management of land issues is delegated to local 
governments (wereda and kebele level). The kebele administrators had previously registered 
community members holding land, noting names and area in terms of local measures, as the 
basis for taxation. The wereda is also in charge of the issuance of certificates. The register in 
which the certificates are noted is kept at the wereda level (WB, 2008). 
                                 2.8.2. Land Registration 
Ethiopia has developed an innovative approach to securing land rights, which is massive in scale, 
pace and cost effectiveness. Land registration and certification started in 1995 in Tigray and now 
covers the states of Amhara, and Southern Nations, Nationalities and peoples. The other states 
such as, Benshanguel Gumuz, Gambella, Somalia, Harari and Afar are not yet included in the 
scheme. Over 15 million households have received a certificate and the registration is by 
household and not by plot (Z.Ayele, 2008). 
The registration of farmland is systematic and takes place at the lowest levels of local 
government (wereda and kebele). The registration of user rights and confirmation of the field 
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boundaries is done in public and neighbors are to be present. The work is done by the so called 
land administration committee. The members of a land administration are from the community 
and work as volunteers. They are selected in consultation with the community and women are to 
be included, according to the instructions. The land administration committees are trained by 
wereda officials of the office of agricultural and rural development. According to the regional 
land proclamations, the land administration committee is a permanent organization that will 
continue to play a role in land conflict mediation, formalization of land rental markets, 
implementing land use planning and monitoring and enhancing more sustainable land use. The 
downside of the approach used is that it is limited to administrative records which lack basic 
spatial framework and registry maps. The updating of the register and issuing of new certificates 
(following divorce, inheritance etc.) is relatively time taking. Various pilots are ongoing to 
develop operational and affordable solutions for spatial referenced data capturing and 
maintenance (WB, 2008). 
Research by the World Bank and others has shown that the registration of land has increased the 
willingness to invest in corps and soils, which is important for improving food security 
(Deininger et al., 2008).  
2.8.3. Gender and Governance in Rural Land Conflict Management 
The constitution of 1995 provides for equal access to land for unmarried women. This was 
implemented during the land redistribution that still took place in the 1990s and improved 
women’s access to land. Women’s user rights were subsequently confirmed by the land 
registration process. To farm the land, women may have to enter into sharecropping agreements 
with those who own oxen (Z.Ayele, 2008). 
In addition, the land registration process now include special measures to protect and strengthen 
women’s’ rights (plot, boundaries). The weredas have been instructed that women should be 
included in the land administration committee, which is important to protect rights. In practice, 
female representation was weak in many committees. Another intervention is that certificates 
now include both the name and picture of both husband and wife (IIED -2005). 
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2.8.4. Land Conflicts in Tigray 
According to the preliminary survey conducted by Mamo, (2005), almost 10 years after the down 
fall of the derg regime produced a picture that shows the wide spread of rural land conflicts since 
1991. He found that out of the sixty households interviewed, about 52% have experienced a 
conflict in relation to rural land. This clearly shows us that conflict management is at the center 
of tenure management which is a pivotal and sensitive political issue in contemporary history of 
Ethiopia as Mamo, (2005) explained. 
According to Bogale et al., (2006), rural land is the main source of conflict in Ethiopia, 
especially in highlands of Tigray with less arable land. Unclear land entitlements and rural land 
scarcity are the main causes of conflicts especially in areas having smaller land plots.  
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2.9.   Conceptual Framework 
Fig.2.1. Transparency and Accountability in Rural Land Governance 
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Local Governance is a shorthand for land and natural resource governance and refers to the 
process by which decisions are made regarding the access to and use of land and natural 
resources, the manner in which those decisions are implemented and the way that conflicting 
interests are reconciled( Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). Thus, Strengthening 
land governance is very important for poverty reduction and sustainable growth. 
Land Governance Strength could be assessed through the Governance Indicators that are used for 
measuring the level of its implementation. Therefore, Transparency and Accountability are used 
to assess the strength of the local Land Governance in the rural community. 
As it can be seen from the figure above, if the transparency and Accountability level of Land 
Governance in the local structures and institutions is weak, definitely the local Land Governance 
is weak. This weakness could result in to; higher number of land conflicts, slow land conflict 
management, expensive and lengthy access to justice and courts, unclear conflict management 
mechanisms, and biased decision making process. These weaknesses further affect the rural 
community’s livelihood adversely. And, then a violent conflict could possibly be occurred, 
unless otherwise there is a strong land conflict management mechanisms are in place. If not, the 
violent conflict could bring social instability and unrest which in return could result in reduction 
of production, unsustainable growth, and finally poverty is exacerbated. 
Whereas, if there is a strong Transparency and Accountability in the local land governance 
structures and institutions, there will be a strong local land governance in place, and it means 
that; Land conflicts will be at a minimum level, land conflict management will be fast and easy, 
access to justice and courts will be easy, there will also be a clear conflict management 
mechanisms and transparent decision making process. In structures and institutions with 
transparent and accountable local land governance, the land conflict management is strong. If 
there are some conflicts occurred, it will be easily solved as long as there is transparency and 
accountability. As a result, stability is secured and there will be a peaceful environment, and the 
rural community livelihood will also be enhanced in a better way. 
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Chapter Three: Methodology of the Study 
The aim of this chapter is to present the research method that is used in the study in order to give 
answers to the research questions as well as describe the process of data collection and analysis.  
3.1. Site Selection and Description of the Study Area 
The study was conducted in Ganta Afeshum wereda of Eastern zone of Tigray in four Kebeles, 
i.e, May Mesanu, Bikot, Golea Genahti, and Sasun Bete Hawariat. Tigray was selected as it is 
the region having an average of less than 0.51 Ha of land size per house hold that is smaller than 
the national average of 1.01 Ha per household (CSA, 2008). Ganta Afeshum wereda was 
selected as it is the densely populated area with large number of rural land conflicts (Ethiopia’s 
agricultural sector policy and investment framework 2010-2020, 2010). Besides, Ganta Afeshum 
is one of the regional weredas of Tigray having the smallest land holding per house hold that is 
less than the national and regional average (CSA, 2008). With regard to the selection of the 
sample kebeles, four kebeles, May Mesanu, Bikot, Golea Genahiti, and Sasun Bete Hawariat are 
selected purposefully. Land conflict prevalence was considered as the main one in selecting the 
sample Kebeles; Besides, Kebeles nearer to urban districts are likely to have more conflicts than 
those far away from the district (wereda) centers due to high population pressure with regard to 
urban expansion (Deininger 2011). Document analysis in the wereda court, list of households 
who faced conflict obtained from the Land administration and use desk, and key informants 
opinion were used to select the sample kebeles. 
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The wereda is located in the eastern part of Tigray region, sharing boundaries with Hawzen in 
the South, Ahferom to the West, Gulomekeda in the North, and Saesie Tsaedaemba in the East. 
Administratively the woreda is divided in to 20 “kebeles” and 73 “Kushets”. Each Kebele is 
divided in to Kushets. It has a total population of 190,066 of which 96% are rural dwellers. 
Population density of Ganta Afeshum is 361.4 persons per square kilometer, with an average of 
4.59 persons to a household. Ganta Afeshum lies between latitude 14° 20′ north and longitude 
39° 15′ east with a total area of 525.93 kilometers (CSA 2008).  
3.2. Research Strategy and Design 
Qualitative research was typically used to answer questions about the complex nature of a 
phenomenon, often with a purpose of describing and understanding the phenomenon from the 
participant’s point of view (Oksana, 2008). Hence, the researcher used a qualitative approach to 
better describe and assess the role of local governance in rural land conflict management. 
Besides, qualitative and quantitative approaches should not be viewed as polar opposites or 
dichotomies (Creswell, 2009) and therefore, the researcher also used quantitative approach to 
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complement the qualitative one and to better describe results through descriptive statistics while 
comparing the sources and types of conflicts.  
In view of making generalization about the target population based on a sample, the researcher 
employed a survey study by developing a structured questionnaire, semi structured interview, 
and focus group discussions. 
3.3 Data Type and Source 
Qualitative and Quantitative type of data were used by making the one supporting the other. The 
available source of data was grouped in to two categories-primary and secondary.  
Primary source or firsthand data were collected from the households who had been experienced a 
conflict that were found listed in the wereda land administration and use desk with in the Office 
of Agriculture and Rural Development. Besides, the firsthand information was also collected 
from the land administrators and land judges at kebele level and judges from wereda courts, 
Agriculture and Natural Resource Experts, and Land Administration and Use Desk Coordinator 
at wereda level. The secondary data was collected from wereda annual reports and kebele land 
administration files. 
3.4. Target Population and Sampling 
The numbers of Households of the Wereda under study were 21,361, of which 4080 goes to the 
four selected kebeles. The researcher predominantly used purposive sampling, a non-
probabilistic sampling to select the households who had experienced conflicts in the last two 
years. Besides, Land Administration and Use Desk Coordinator, Agriculture and Natural 
Resource Expert and court judges at wereda level, and land judges and land administrators at 
kebele level were purposively selected as they are directly and indirectly engaged in local land 
governance and rural land conflict management in their day to day activities. Ganta Afeshum 
wereda was purposively selected. Because the wereda is more convenient for the researcher since 
the researcher is familiar with the place. Besides the wereda is a conflict prone area as it is a dry 
highland area with less arable land (Ethiopia’s agricultural sector policy and investment 
framework 2010-2020, 2010). Furthermore, the land size per house hold in the wereda is less 
than the national and regional average that is 0.5 Ha (CSA, 2008). 
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Four kebeles were selected purposively by their prevalence to rural land conflict. And 
households were randomly selected from the total population who had experienced conflicts.  
The data was collected from respondents of different geographical locations (kebeles). 
Therefore, Households from different geographical areas were entertained to a questionnaire, 
interview and focus group discussion to give their response regarding the challenges, roles, 
processes and contents of good governance in rural land conflict settlements in the wereda. 
Simultaneously, it also tried to explore inherent characteristics in relation to challenges of the 
good governance while settling rural land conflicts or it provided a deeper understanding of the 
subject under study.  
A sample size of 150 were employed for this study as G. Kiros., (2012) with a title “challenges 
of Good Governance in Local Government: the case of Saesie tsaeda amba woreda, Tigray 
Region, Ethiopia”, H.Tesfay, (2011) with a title “Rural Land Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in 
Tigray”, Yang and Paul,(2005) with a title “ E-government application at local level: issues and 
Challenges” had used the same number of samples in their researches that are similar to the title 
of the researcher. The researcher also believed that this sample size is representative in a 
qualitative research type. In selecting respondents from each kebele, the researcher used similar 
proportion. The list in the Land Administration and Use Desk with in the Office of the wereda 
Agriculture and Rural Development is the main source used to select the sample households. The 
households with in the list who visited the kebele administration on March 12-13/2013 and on 
March 19-20/ 2013 for a meeting were given the questionnaires. Accordingly, 105 households 
have filled the questionnaires on those days. The other 31 households with in the list are selected 
by their proximity to the kebele administration office with the help of the four kebele 
administrators. Thus, the enumerator visited the nearby 31 households and provided them the 
questionnaire to fill.  
3.5. Instruments of Data Collection and Field Work 
A well-structured Questionnaire was used to collect data from the households who experienced 
conflicts in the last two years in order to make data comparison on the results found from 
different respondents. A face to face interview was also made with the wereda land 
administration and use desk Coordinator to get information on how land was governed at local 
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level in relation to transparency and accountability and about the main challenges of land 
governance, as this office is in charge of governing the rural land at local level. Wereda court 
judges were also interviewed in order to know how they were dealing with land related issues 
when compared to other court cases, with kebele land administrators in order to get the 
information on how they were dealing with the land administration process in the rural areas, on 
the skills they had and what their feeling were towards  transparency and accountability in land 
administration; and with land judges in order to get information on the sources and types of 
conflict that are occurred frequently, how they are dealing with them, the skills and experiences 
they had, their feeling on the litigation process at kebele level. The researcher used semi 
structured questions during the interview in order to give the researcher a chance to raise 
questions that were important but not clear and to raise additional questions out of the list to 
support the study with better and reliable information.  
A focus group discussion was also used while collecting data. The size of the focus group 
discussants were six in number. Two focus group discussion sessions had been conducted during 
the data collection process. The members of the focus group discussion in each session were: one 
wereda land administration and use desk coordinator, one kebele land administrator and one 
kebele land judge and three farmers who faced conflicts more than two times. The facilitator of 
the session was the wereda land administration and use desk Coordinator. These six individuals 
were selected, as they are the real rural land governance practitioners, and they have a better 
knowledge on land governance practices and its challenges, the sources and types of conflicts on 
rural lands. Besides, they all have an ample experience on managing conflicts. 
3.6. Data Processing and Analysis 
The quantitative data was first tallied and processed through Microsoft excel and is analyzed 
with the help of descriptive statistics-frequency distribution and percentages. It was presented in 
terms of charts, graphs and tables. Besides, the qualitative data was presented in a descriptive 
way. 
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Chapter Four – Results and Discussions 
This chapter deals with data presentation and analysis. Following the methodology, the data is 
presented and analyzed with the help of descriptive statistics. Hence, to come up with findings 
and possible recommendations appropriate methodology was used. Primary data was gathered 
through instruments of structured questionnaire, semi structured interview, and focus group 
discussion. However, of the total 150 sample respondents expected to fill the questionnaire, 14 
respondents were found defected. Therefore, findings were drawn based on the evidence 
obtained from the 136 households and respondents of the focus group discussion and the 
interviewees.  
4.1. Background of Respondents 
The first hand data, since it is collected from farmer households, the socio demographic factors 
are expected to explain them well. The age range is adopted from Ganta Afeshum wereda annual 
land use report of 2011/2012 budget year. 
Table 4.1: Age and Gender of Respondents 
   Frequency of conflict  Total 
    Once Twice Three times 
      
Age <25 Freq. 12 0 1 13 
    %  12.4% 0.0% 25.0% 9.6% 
  25-50 Freq. 67 0 0 67 
    %  69.1% 0.0% 0.0% 49.3% 
  51-75 Freq. 18 35 3 56 
   %  18.6% 100.0% 75.0% 41.2% 
Total Freq. 97 35 4 136 
  %  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
      
Gender Female  Freq. 56 0 0 56 
    %  57.7% 0.0% 0.0% 41.2% 
  Male Freq. 41 35 4 80 
    %  42.3% 100.0% 100.0% 58.8% 
       
Total Freq. 97 35 4 136 
  %  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Own Computation from Survey Data, 2013 
 
46 
 
The finding from table 4.1 shows that, of the total respondents about 49 percent are within the 
age range of 26 to 50, whereas about 41 percent of them are in the range of 51-75. It is highly 
expected that, in the environment that youngsters (<25 years) have less access to arable land to 
lead their life via agriculture, there will be high urban migration. Thus, the youngsters were less 
prone to rural land conflicts. It may be stemmed from the low availability of farm land in the 
wereda (Ethiopia’s agricultural sector policy and investment framework 2010-2020, 2010). With 
regard to the gender of respondents, 80(58.82%) were found male households that revealed 
majority of the households were headed by male. 
In the other way, it is important to know the marital status of respondents to clearly understand 
which group is more prone to conflicts.  
Table 4.2: Marital status of Respondents 
Marital status Frequency Percentage 
   
single 0 0 
married 90 66.18 
Divorced 36 26.47 
widowed 10 7.35 
 Total 136 100 
Source: Own Computation from Survey Data, 2013 
Thus, the data revealed that 90 respondents were found married and 36(26.47%) were found 
divorced. The other 7.35% of the respondents were the widowed one. Therefore, we could say 
that, most of the rural land conflicts were raised by the married ones, as the family sizes of the 
married are larger than those of divorced and widowed. 
Land size and annual income of respondents are also the factors used to triangulate their inter 
relations with the rural land conflicts.  
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Table 4.3: Land Size and Annual income of Households 
   Frequency of conflict Total 
    Once Twice Three times 
      
Land 
size 
<0.5 Freq. 37 00 00 37 
    %  38.1% 0.0% 0.0% 27.2% 
  0.5-1.0 Freq. 60 35 2 97 
    %  61.9% 100.0% 50.0% 71.3% 
  1.01-1.5 Freq. 00 00 2 2 
    %  0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 1.5% 
Total Freq. 97 35 4 136 
  %  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Annual 
income 
≤5000 Freq. 88 00 00 88 
    %  90.7% 0.0% 0.0% 64.7% 
  5001-10000 Freq. 9 29 00 38 
    %  9.3% 82.9% 0.0% 27.9% 
  10001-15000 Freq. 00 6 4 10 
    %  .0% 17.1% 100.0% 7.4% 
       
Total Freq. 97 35 4 136 
  %  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
      
Source: Own Computation from Survey Data, 2013 
Accordingly, based on the cross tabulation (Table 4.3), it was found that of the 97 respondents 
faced a conflict only once, 88(90.7%) of them had an annual income of less than 5000 Birr. But 
29 respondents of the 35 who faced a conflict twice were getting an annual income of 5001 to 
10000 birr. However, none of the respondents at the lower level of income have faced a conflict 
twice. It can be inferred that the frequency of conflict occurrences may increase as household’s 
income increase. This could be associated with the lack of interest and capacity of the poor to 
afford conflict litigations more than once as courts are considered as costly and biased towards 
the rich (FAO, 2007). 
It was also revealed that as land size of the house hold had increased, the frequency of the 
conflict occurrence also raised.  Table 4.3 indicates that all the households who faced conflict 
twice were in the land size range of 0.5 up to 1.0 ha. In addition, none of the respondents with a 
land size of less than 0.5 ha had faced a conflict twice or more. This may be emanated from the 
belief of the households to win the litigation process by deceiving the poor as they had a 
relatively better annual income to afford win the litigation.    
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Table 4.4: Source of Household Livelihood  
Main source of livelihood Frequency Percentage 
   
Farming 134 98.53 
Livestock 1 0.74 
Irrigation 1 0.74 
Total 136 100 
Source: Own Computation from Survey Data, 2013 
Considering the family size, the per capita income may be low as expected from households 
whose main stay is only agriculture and having a size of about 0.5 to 1 hectare. This may 
possibly motivate them to search for other resources of income that are either found in nearby or 
migrate to other places for better jobs. Nevertheless, the level of livelihood diversification 
through irrigation and/or livestock is minimal. According to table 4.4, of the total respondents 
about 98 percent had found that farming is their main source of livelihood.  
Table 4.5: Household Type, Educational Level, and Household Size of Respondents  
               Descriptions   Frequency of conflict Total 
    Once Twice Three times 
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female 
Headed 
Freq. 46 0 0 46 
  %  47.4% 0.0% 0.0% 33.8% 
Male 
Headed 
Freq. 51 35 4 90 
  %  52.6% 100.0% 100.0% 66.2% 
Total Freq. 97 35 4 136 
  %  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Illiterate  Freq. 44 0 0 44 
  %  45.4% 0.0% 0.0% 32.4% 
Read and 
Write  
Freq. 52 0 0 52 
  %  53.6% 0.0% 0.0% 38.2% 
Primary 
Education  
Freq. 1 27 0 28 
  %  1.0% 77.1% 0.0% 20.6% 
Secondary 
Education  
Freq. 0 8 4 12 
  %  0.0% 22.9% 100.0% 8.8% 
Total Freq. 97 35 4 136 
  %  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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≤3 Freq. 12 0 0 12 
  %  12.4% 0.0% 0.0% 8.8% 
4-6 Freq. 78 0 0 78 
  %  80.4% 0.0% 0.0% 57.4% 
7-10 Freq. 7 35 4 46 
 %  7.2% 100.0% 100.0% 33.8% 
Total Freq. 97 35 4 136 
  %  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Own Computation from Survey Data, 2013 
According to table 4.5, it was also found that households having large family size may have 
frequent occurrence of conflicts (the base of classification for the household size is by the 
researchers own assumption that, a household could be the husband and wife only or with one 
child at minimum, and husband and wife with 8 children and above at maximum). Thus, of the 
total respondents who faced conflicts twice or three times, majority have large family size of 
about 7-10. To be specific, of the 35 respondents faced twice, all of them have a family size of 7-
10. Besides, all of those who faced three times were also in this family size range. This might be 
due to the reason that the large family could try to expand land holding so as to increase the 
rising demand for more income to sustain their subsistence life. Furthermore, large family size 
intertwined with low level of income might lead to conflicts. 
On the other hand, large numbers of conflicts were occurred with respondents having low level 
of education. In terms of frequency of occurrence, it was found that as the educational level of 
households increased, the frequency also raised (table 4.5). This could be attributed to the 
personal belief of the household that they have a better educational knowledge and had a better 
position in winning the conflicts. That is why, the major households who faced conflicts twice or 
three times are in primary and secondary educational level. Of the total respondents faced a 
conflict twice, the household is found headed by male. Whereas, female headed type of 
household faced a conflict only once. This might be because of the culture prevailed in the 
society that acknowledged supremacy of male as a head of household and it undermined the 
capacity and leadership skill of women as  indicated in Ubik, (2008). 
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4.2. Local Land Governance  
4.2.1. Land Entitlements Status 
The shortage of rural land mixed with large family size and low level of annual income may 
burst out rural land conflicts during an effort to meet household livelihood requirements. Unless 
the rural land is backed by clear rural land entitlement, conflict may be difficult to manage.  
Table 4.6: Frequency Distribution of Land Entitlements and Settlement of Land Conflicts   
Land entitlement status Number of land conflicts faced 
for the last two years 
Settlement status of the conflict 
 Frequency  Percent   Frequency  Percent   Frequency  Percent  
Not yet 0 0 1 97 71.32 Not yet 68 50 
Already 
received 
136 100 2 35 25.74 partially 
settled 
24 17.65 
     3 4 2.94 Fully 
settled 
44 32.35 
     ≥ 4   0      
Total                136             100          136               100                          136             136 
Source: Own Computation from Survey Data, 2013 
A survey on rural land entitlement revealed that all of them were entitled, but 97 of them have 
faced a conflict related to land for one time during the last two years. But the numbers of 
respondents who face land conflict twice during last two years were also about 35 respondents 
that were around 25.73% (Table 4.6).  
But in contrary to the importance of entitlement, the status of conflict settlements showed that 68 
(50%) of respondents have not yet settled their land conflicts, and 32(47.06%) of the unresolved 
conflicts were appealed to the regional courts. Only 44(32.35%) of the respondents were found 
that their conflict was fully settled. The other 17.65% of the conflicts were partially settled. This 
may be due to the level of seriousness of the conflict and the weakness of the system of conflict 
management system prevailed in the locality. It was also found that there was an overlapping 
offer of land certificate ownerships to the farmers in the community. 
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Source: from survey data, 2013 
The tradition available showed that unless otherwise the respondent was divorced or unmarried, 
it is unlikely the household to be headed by female. From this point of view, it may be expected 
that the level of impact could vary sex wise. 
 
Source: own computation from survey data, 2013     
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 Evidence revealed that, out of the total respondents, 72(52.94%) of them had shown that land 
conflict had unequal effect between male and female because of the cultural or customary 
discrimination imposed up on them. In contrary, 64 respondents showed that land conflict was 
affecting both male and female equally (Fig.4.2). This number is significant in relation to the 
tradition of the society where females were highly discriminated whereas the constitution grants 
women equal right as of their fellow men. This clearly indicates that there is a gap in laws and its 
implementation in the ground. Ineffective law enforcement could be the main reason for the 
discrimination of women in the land related issues in the specific study area. The efforts 
prevailed on woman empowerment may have been resulted in little improvements only as the 
women’s discrimination on rural land related issues are still in place.  
4.3. Rural Land Conflict Management 
Conflict by its nature is considered most of the time as negative, devastating in terms of 
economic resources and also could possibly lead to the extent of sacrificing life (Spielman et al, 
2008).  
Fig 4.3: With Whom Conflict is Occurred Frequently (in percent) 
 
Source: own computation from survey data, 2013 
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In conformity with this, about 91 percent of the respondents noticed that it is always negative in 
nature, conflict may happen either with neighbors, or across family members, or with someone in 
the community. It is found that about 87 percent of the respondents faced a conflict with 
neighbors (Fig 4.3). This is in conformity with the result that the type of conflict mostly occurred 
was boundary conflict where neighbors could share. On the other hand, conflict among family 
members also occurred but it is insignificant. Only about 12(8.82%) respondents responded that 
they faced a conflict within their family member.  
However, what matters in most conflicts as to their effect is whether it is solved easily through 
effective land conflict management mechanisms or not. If it takes long time to solve because of 
having complications, the outcome may hamper households’ life that may result to the extent of 
loss of life. From the experience of the respondents, there are different mechanisms of solving 
disputes or conflicts depending on the seriousness of the conflict. The mechanisms can be seen 
as formal and informal ways where the formal one may have clear and visible rules to resolve 
conflicts. It may also compose legally assigned individuals to handle such and other related 
issues. However, there is also informal way of settlement of conflicts such as customary or 
traditional conflict managements.  
Table 4.7: Frequency Distribution of Choice of Conflict Management  
Type of conflict management  No. of respondents agreed Percentages  
Informal  123 90.44 
Formal  13 9.56 
Total 136 100 
Source: own computation from survey data, 2013 
According to table 4.7, the informal way was the commonly chosen means of conflict 
management practices. During ancient times, where there was not well established formal way of 
conflict management, the traditional or customary way is the only and preferred one. The legal 
system was very poor in terms of reaching the community and its structural and institutional 
incapability besides to the inexistence of land policies, laws and regulations if it exists otherwise 
there was no such a formally established system. Moreover, since formal education has 
introduced to Ethiopia during late 19
th
 century, there was no skilled manpower that can either 
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judge based on legal documents or prepare legal documents and act accordingly.  This may lead 
to habituate and recognize the informal way of management as their priori.  
Regarding the way of conflict resolution and preference of the local community, it was found 
that the customary way of conflict management was primarily chosen by the community because 
of the fact that the resolution is based on the win- win policy- that benefits both sides. Hence, the 
legal land conflict management would consider supporting the informal one on the assumption 
that it supports government on doing such routine works. It could also reduce the cost that the 
government could incur to manage rural land conflicts. On top of this, it is important to give 
recognition as much as the mechanism leads to sustainable conflict management. The evidence 
from the survey also revealed that 100 percent of the respondents did agree that the formal way 
of conflict resolution should consider the customary one as it is based on win-win and acceptable 
approach that lead to sustainable conflict management and establishing of strong relationship 
with the community.   
 
Source: own computation from survey data, 2013 
Nevertheless, evidence showed that the formal was chosen as secondary. Though this was 
according to the prior interest of the litigants, most of the cases that were raised at local level 
were filed at the legal governmental institutions and this needs further research. Only 25 out of 
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the total respondents had managed their conflicts informally and the other 111(81.62%) were 
using the legal or formal way, though they first attempted to address it informally through the 
traditional ways. This clearly shows us that now days the informal ways are very weak and 
cannot handle the issue of litigants at local level as they are getting weaker from time to time 
because of the decentralization and local government systems (UN Habitat, 2007).  
Table 4.8: Factors for Choosing the Formal Means  
Criteria Frequencies 
 Strongly 
disagree  
Disagree  Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
      
Enhancement of a clearly and 
previously established rule of law 
12 80 30 14 0 
Clearly  defined penalties 10 92 19 13 0 
professionalism of judges 16 89 21 10 0 
Impartial procedures  34 81 20 0 0 
No interest by the  community to 
manage conflicts customarily  
92 32 12 0 0 
standardized procedures for 
determination, recording, and 
dissemination of information 
17 92 27 0 0 
      
  Source: own computation from survey data, 2013 
On top of this, respondents also strongly disagreed that formal means of conflict management 
could be chosen based on its unique features such as the availability of previously established 
rule of law, having clearly defined penalties, professionalism of judges, impartial procedures, 
community not interested to manage conflicts with the customary way, and availability of 
standardized procedures for determination, recording, and dissemination of information (UNDP, 
2007)  as also indicated in Table 4.8. Rather, they exceed the informal one above the formal. But, 
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as the informal one was weak, they do not have a choice other than submitting it to the formal 
one. 
According to table 4.8, 92(67.65%) the respondents did not agree on the point that the formal 
one is better because of lack of interest by the community to manage conflicts customarily.  
Rather, they have had more interest to manage customarily. On top of this 34 respondents had 
also asserted that the presence of impartial procedures could not outweigh their choice towards 
informal one. This could reveal us that they might had doubt over the procedures towards 
fairness and hence impartiality. The presence of standardized procedures for determination, 
recording, and dissemination of information, availability of professional judges, and clearly 
defined penalties could not still bias them towards formal. All in all, the formal way was not 
chosen rather the available customary law had got much focus by the community as it saves time 
and other resource (Transparency international, 2007).  
The dominance of informal may be predominantly by the fact that it does not lead to the 
recognition of loser and gainer in which the community highly disliked it and is based on 
consensus that benefited both parties. Communities would like to have a win- win type of 
conflict management.  
Table 4.9: Factors for Choosing the Informal Means  
Criteria Frequencies 
 Strongly 
disagree  
Dis 
agree 
 Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
Judges lack knowledge about the rural land   15 89 32 
Judges are practically unfit to the diverse 
local conditions 
  4 27 105 
Legal procedures necessarily results in the 
recognition of “Loser” and “Winner”, which 
is not easily acceptable by the rural 
community and it invites for further revenge 
and conflict 
  0 0 136 
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Sometimes, the impartiality of courts is also 
questionable, in view of frequent accusations 
related to corruption practices with in the 
judiciary 
  40 89 5 
Courts and tribunals are overcrowded with 
land conflicts, a situation that reflects the 
limited effectiveness of the judicial system 
  2 12 122 
Justice is not accessible to the poor and 
marginalized due to costliness of courts, 
informal fees, long procedures, many 
bureaucratic red tapes and the coverage of 
courts 
  12 42 82 
Formal courts are not trusted by the villagers 
especially the poor and marginalized as courts 
are time consuming, biased to the rich, and 
judges need bribes 
 12 38 82 4 
Judges decisions are not properly understood 
by the illiterate rural community, as a result 
they are not confident on the court to manage 
the conflict up to their expectations 
 46 36 39 15 
Customary management of conflicts better 
secure rural stakeholders’ land entitlements 
48 38 40 10 0 
Customary conflict management is a 
consensus building way that benefits both 
parties 
0 0 0 0 136 
      
Source: own computation from survey data, 2013 
Thus, of the factors that made respondents to choose informal means, the way it is based on 
consensus and does not lead to recognition of a gainer and a loser has strongly agreed by all the 
respondents. Moreover, the ineffectiveness of courts and tribunals and the mismatch of judges to 
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diverse local conditions also strongly agreed as factors of choice for an informal means of 
conflict management (UNDP, 2007) as also indicated in Table 4.9. 
Though the informal one was the dominant means of managing conflicts, it may also have 
adverse effects on timely management of conflicts and other possible material loses.  
Table 4.10: Frequency Distribution of Delay Time to Manage Conflict  
Delay time to manage conflict  Formal or legal  Percent  Informal  percent 
     
Less than a year 64 47.06 121 88.97 
1-2 years 25 18.38 15 11.03 
2 to 3 years  11 8.09 0 0 
More than 3 years 36 26.47 0 0 
 136 100 136 100 
Source: own computation from survey data, 2013 
Accordingly, the customary method could take up to 2 years to the extreme to manage conflicts. 
However, the formal or legal means of management could take to manage more than 3 years may 
be up to 8 years with some rare cases according to the survey. Evidence from table 4.8 showed 
that respondents who faced a delay (all of them have faced) of managing a rural land conflict 
through the customary way for about less than a year were about 121. But the number of 
respondents who faced a delay for about less than a year with the formal way was about 64. This 
seems that the formal means is superior in managing conflicts within a short period of time. 
Nevertheless, looking in to the number of respondents whose delay was between one to two 
years, the numbers of respondents in the formal and informal were found 25 and 15 respectively. 
Thus, the level of delay in the legal way of managing land conflict outweighed the informal one.  
Moreover, it was found that, conflicts stay more at kebele level when managed legally than at 
wereda or district level. It is expected that the efficiency of wereda level courts could outweigh 
that of kebele land judges. The wereda court judges are more professional than their kebele 
counterparts. On top of this, conflicts go to wereda only if the kebele fails to manage it. And this 
makes the burden of resolving the land conflict lay at kebele level and it had worsened the delay 
on conflict management. The kebele land judges were not also motivated because there was no 
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any system for payment, training, and other incentive mechanisms. The land judges only held 
land conflict litigations once per week, which is on Saturday. Sometimes this day may be a 
holiday where the litigation process could delay for another weeks. However, the reason for 
delay at wereda level was mainly the bureaucratic nature of the structure. There were lots of 
bureaucracies, red tapes, corruptions, and biasedness and the inaccessibility of the justice and 
courts by the poor and marginalized groups (UN Habitat, 2009) as to many of the respondents.  
Irrespective of saying this, respondents could also face different challenges during legal 
management of conflict. This was especially enlarged when the rural communities try to manage 
their cases through the wereda courts. Accordingly, time, money, property, relationship, and 
labor were found the serious challenges households face when they tried to manage the conflicts 
legally or formally at wereda level. As long as they go long distances and stay long hours 
coupled with delay of litigations in the courts, the time they waste is too large. Had they been 
devoting their time in a wage earning activities, plus the wastage of money during their stay at 
the court or land judgments, they definitely benefit more on their day to day lives.  
In contrast to this, the challenge from customary means of managing rural land conflict was the 
difficulty to bring the middle men all together at a time. Difficulty on who to select for 
customary resolution among alternatives available since most of them are not interested was also 
found a challenge.  
4.3.1. Stakeholders of Local Governance in Land Conflict Management 
According to the findings of the focus group discussion, there were many stakeholders involved 
in land governance at local level. At kebele level, there were kebele land administrators and land 
judges in charge of the formal administrative structure. There were also elected community 
members to oversee land related issue before the cases were submitted to the formal one. But, 
most of the time they were not willing to hear land related cases. They did not have an interest to 
negotiate the conflicting parties. They considered it as it is not their own business as they did not 
get any incentives from the local government and the community. The people were also not 
interested to go to these elected community members. Rather, if they need to manage the land 
issue informally, most of the time they call elders, religious leaders, and sometimes neighbors. 
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At wereda level, if the issue was on land use, it was managed by the wereda land administration 
and use desk, whereas if it was out of the issue of land use, the litigants directly submit the issue 
to the wereda court in the form of appeal.  
There may be various stakeholders in the governance of rural land conflict management among 
which government including its staffs could be one.  
Table 4.11: Land Administration Staffs at Wereda and Kebele Level   
Response  Capacity Experience  
  
Corruption  
Yes  12 8 corrupted 81 
No  124 128 Not corrupted 13 
   Not sure 42 
Total   136 136     136 
Source: own computation from survey data, 2013 
Furthermore, the capacity of land administration staffs at kebele level according to the survey, 
were found that they were not capable enough to manage rural land conflicts. About 
124(91.18%) of the total respondents had evaluated the kebele staffs as incapable of handling 
land issues. This may lead to low reliance of the community on kebele government structure. 
This incapability of the rural land conflict management may be sourced from the low experience, 
and corruptness of the staffs as indicated in table 4.11. And as a result, Corruption has a negative 
effect on the gear of a development, hinders any advancement in economic growth and 
democracy (UNDP, 2004). 
Besides, the customary way of conflict management was represented by a group of individuals 
selected on their potential to do so, experience of conflict management, reputation and 
willingness they have. It was composed of elders, neighbors, elected community members, 
religious leaders, and parents. But the composition disregarded the poor and marginalized groups 
(table 4.12).  
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Table 4.12: Involvement of Various Groups in Rural Land Conflict Management  
Response  Poor and marginalized groups Civic organizations 
 Frequency  Percent  Frequency  Percent  
Yes  56 41.18 0 0 
No  80 58.82 136 100 
Total 136 100 136 100 
Source: own computation from survey data, 2013 
The low involvement of those poor and marginalized was because of the low acceptance they 
had in the community But. Neglecting of those groups may make the conflict management 
process unsustainable and unacceptable.  
In governance, the stakeholders (Government, civic society organizations and the private sector) 
are expected to be engaged actively (Shah, 2006), though their role could vary, and among which 
government is expected to have key roles.  
Fig. 4.5: Role of Government in Local Land Governance   
 
Source: own computation from survey data, 2013 
Based on the survey, however, it was found that the role of government seems insignificant. Of 
the total respondents, about 112 disagreed on the idea that government had a key role in local 
land governance rather; only 12 of them have agreed.   
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Besides, the lack of a system which encouraged participation of the poor and marginalized 
individuals at local level worsened the low participation of these groups. The society may also 
undermine the marginalized groups. This is in conformity with GTZ’s, (2008) explanations about 
women exclusion in land governance. Women were denied equal tenure rights with the same 
degree of security as enjoyed by men, then society as a whole and children in particular, suffer. 
When women enjoy equal rights, conflicts are reduced, environments are improved and 
household living conditions are enhanced. Gender discrimination in land rights is culturally 
engrained (GTZ, 2008).  
They were also neglected socially where socialization could create awareness and develop skill 
to handle such conflicts. The negligence of the government to these groups in land governance 
also found another important reason why they have low involvement. According to the focus 
group discussants, it was found that participation of those groups would have been increase had 
it been government involved highly in local land governance. This is due to the fact that 
government has the role to sustain equality and should practically support the equality of all 
groups regardless of religion, ethnicity, gender, etc (UNDP, 2004).  
Contrary to the low involvement of government in local land governance, the involvement of 
civic organization was also null (table 4.12), though involvement of all relevant stakeholders 
(Manila, 2003) is very important for creating awareness in the community for sustainable and 
smooth local land governance. It was found that there was no system available at ground that 
encourages any civic organizations to participate on land related issues. Besides, there was no 
any previous experience in which rural land conflict had managed with the participation of civic 
organizations. That may also be originated from the lack of civic organizations participating in 
the areas.  
4.4. Sources and Types of Rural Land Conflicts 
The source of rural land conflict may vary depending on the type of issue that could come to an 
agenda. Evidence showed that there are at least six sources ranked from the most to the least 
source of conflict in the specific study area (Ganta Afeshum wereda). 
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Table 4.13: Source of Rural Land Conflicts and Their Rank  
 Source of Conflict    Rank    
 Unclear land entitlement procedures 1 Overlapping of land ownership that is offered by the 
local land administration also played a significant role 
in igniting the rural land conflicts in the wereda. 
government land appropriation schemes 2 
ineffectiveness of law enforcements 3 
land tenure in security 4 
Rural land scarcity 5 
land holding inequalities  6 
Source: Own Computation from Survey Data, 2013 
Accordingly, unclear land entitlement procedure was the first in terms of rank as a source of 
conflict and land holding inequalities was the least. This unclear procedure may be originated 
from the lack of clear procedures, guidelines, policies towards rural land, and low 
implementation capacity of the implementers. It could also be attributed to the biased distribution 
of land by the individuals who were selected to redistribute the land to the community after the 
EPRDF government assumes power in 1990s. These individuals were redistributing the land as 
to their emotional interests. They were providing different sizes of land for a house hold with the 
same family size. If the households with the same family size but different size of land plots are 
neighbors, it is most probable that conflict will erupt. Furthermore, There were not any 
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms made by the wereda and regional land administration 
staffs and the local government in general as they were not been established very well the time 
land was redistributed. 
Most of the conflicts raised at kebele level are land related cases (Gizachew, 2011). As a result, it 
was found that most of the respondents in the last two years have faced conflicts once if not 
twice in relation to rural land. However, the types of conflict vary depending on the nature of the 
specific issue brought in to agenda. Accordingly, it was found boundary, inheritance, and 
conflicts on vacated and absentee of ownership of land, and intra linage conflicts were the 
different types of conflicts experienced in the study area in the level of their rank.  
 
 
64 
 
Table 4.14: Types of Rural Land Conflicts and Their Rank  
Types of conflict  Ranks 
  
Boundary conflicts 1 
inheritance conflicts 2 
conflicts on vacated and absentee ownership of land 3 
Intra lineage conflicts 4 
 Source: Own Computation from Survey Data, 2013 
Boundary conflict was the most noticed type of conflict followed by inheritance (Table 4.13). 
This type of conflict – may be seen as economic conflict, was also the first conflict noticed in 
most poor and marginalized people. As boundary conflicts are also seen as a cover for other 
reasons of conflict as it is easy to start it up. This also could be attributed to the unclear land 
entitlement procedures, government land appropriation schemes, in effectiveness of enforcement 
of law and land scarcity and poverty in the community in general. 
 
Source: own computation from survey data, 2013 
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Figure 4.6: Types of Conflicts and Their Frequency of Occurrence 
Boundary conflicts(81%)
Inheritance conflicts(10%)
conflicts on vacated and absentee ownership of land(4%)
Intra lineage conflicts(2%)
Others(3%)
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Moreover, the traditional way of demarcating boundaries with short span may burst conflicts on 
the effort to expand boundaries by settlers. In addition, unclear transfer of inheritances by parents 
over their children could create conflicts upon entitlement among brothers and sisters. The living 
tradition of taking inherited land was seen as an important thing for raising the social value of the 
inherited individual. In Tigray, land is beyond economic value, it is seen as a means of getting 
social value and dignity (USAID, 2009). Hence, this may create a conflict over getting a 
dominance of one on the other.  These were the mostly recurred types of conflicts but not the 
only. A conflict over ownership of the same land with public holdings was also another type of 
conflict experienced in the study area. This may be observed in the ownership of hills and 
grazing lands for the purpose of livestock rearing.  
4.5. Transparency and Accountability of Local Land Governance in 
Conflict Management 
The level of rural land conflict management may also depend on the transparency and 
accountability of local land governance. Local government may play their key role depending on 
the social acceptance they have. The transparency of the local land governance was attempted to 
measure using the criteria of availability and access of information to community about the land 
ownership, value, and its use, availability of standard procedures, recording, and dissemination 
of information, supervision by local authorities, and the possibility to appeal as are noted in Van 
der Molen, (2007). Based on these criteria different degree of agreement was found from 
respondents.  
Table 4.15: Level of Transparency in Local Land Governance 
Criteria  Frequencies Total 
 Strongly 
disagree  
Disagree  Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
 
Land information is always available 
to the community 
0 3 48 85 0 136 
There is open access to information 
about ownership, value and use of 
land 
0 42 89 5 0 136 
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There are standardized procedures for 
determination, recording and 
dissemination of information 
4 64 58 10 0 136 
There is a supervision by the local 
authorities 
136 0 0 0 0 136 
There is always a possibility of appeal 0 0 31 105 0 136 
       
Source: own computation from survey data, 2013 
Accordingly, about 63 percent of the respondents (Table 4.15) were found that they agreed on 
the availability of land information. But about 65 percent did not agree with the open access of 
information about land ownership, value, and use. It can be asserted in the other way that, there 
is no system for open access that may be due to the lack of professionals that can handle all the 
land issues with efficiency. About 64 respondents also affirmed that they totally disagree on the 
availability of standardized procedures for determination, recording, and dissemination of 
information about rural land that supported for the disagreement by majority of the respondents 
on the non-existence of open access to information. The other respondents did agree nor disagree 
on the factors used to evaluate the level of transparency. It was because they were not in need of 
land information and off course they did not need to access the land information. Besides, they 
did not face any biases while settling their conflicts. 
Given the above transparency problems, if it is not backed by enough supervision of authorities, 
the transparency problem could be exacerbated. It is expected that with lack of open access to 
information in addition to the lack of standard procedures of recording and dissemination of 
information about rural land, the supervision may be low. If it is so, the transparency problem 
could be seen easily. And, what was found from the survey, supervision was very low. As it can 
be seen from table 4.15, all of the respondents agreed that there was no supervision from local 
authorities as a means of rural land governance. Lack of check and balance even may enhance to 
corruption where it was found that staffs of local administration are corrupted (Table 4.11) and 
the rural community may develop suspicion about the fair management of a conflict. However, 
the possibility of appeal may reduce the doubt regarding fairness even though appealing could 
lead to waste of time, energy, property and other resources which were described by respondents 
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as the mere challenges of conflict management through legal procedures especially to the poor 
and the marginalized groups. Regardless of the negative effect of appealing, it may be important 
in an environment where there is no open information access about land. According to the 
survey, most of the respondents (about 105 individuals of the total) assured that there was an 
available system for possible appeals. 
Table 4.16: Level of Accountability in Local Land Governance 
Criteria  Frequencies Total 
 Strongly 
disagree  
Disagree  Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
 
The land governance institutions are 
 responsive as demand arises from the 
community 
0 36 55 45 0 136 
There are mechanisms for questioning 
and explaining the ongoing land 
activities in the community. 
57 62 17 0 0 136 
The community is involved in every 
land related issues and have a say on it 
38 72 24 2 0 136 
Kebele land administrators and land 
judges are elected by the community 
and could be fired by the community 
if necessary 
 28 40 68 0 136 
       
Source: own computation survey data, 2013 
 
According to the factors used to evaluate the accountability of the local land governance, the 
land governance institutions were found responsive as demand arises from the community, 
though there were not mechanisms for questioning and explaining the ongoing land activities in 
the community. Besides, the community was involved in every land related issues and had a say 
on it. But, Kebele land administrators and land judges were elected by the community and could 
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be fired by the community if necessary. Thus, it was found that 45(33%) of the respondents 
agree that the institutions at local level in charge of land governance were responsive when 
demand raised, but109 (80.15%) disagreed that there were not mechanisms for questioning and 
explaining the ongoing land activities to the whole community other than the specific litigants. 
Besides 110(80.88%) also disagreed that the community was not involved in every land related 
issues and did not have a say on it. This may be attributed to the non-participative nature of the 
local government as indicated in the transparency part above. But, most of them agreed that they 
had a say on the electing and firing of the land administrators and land judges at kebele level. 
4.6. Local Governance Structures and Institutions 
Availability of well-designed governing structures and procedures about rural land conflict 
management could boost transparency. However, with unclear government structures, the role of 
government in conflict management and the level of transparency were found very low. 
According to the survey, the belief of respondents over the supportive role of the government 
structure towards rural land conflict management was vague though the negative outweighed. 
About 72(52.94%) respondents did not agree on the supportive nature of the structure and its 
institutions, even though some of the respondents agreed on the support of the structure and its 
institutions based on the reason that there are structures and institutions in place for rural land 
governance, such as land administration and land judges at kebele level and Land Administration 
and Use Desk at wereda level. It seems to be believed that these structures are created for the 
purpose of supporting the rural land conflict management, though their service provision is low 
due to the lack of transparency and accountability as indicated in tables 4.15 and 4.16 
respectively. But the majority did not agree on the support provided to the community by the 
structure and its institutions, due to the fact that the available institutions were not adequately 
equipped with skilled and experienced personnel. It is true that inefficiency may be the feature of 
these institutions if they lack the necessary element of skilled and experienced personnel, where 
it is easy to see their supportive nature as low.  
Besides, it was found that local land governance structures and institutions were weak in terms of 
the coverage, and capability to reach and serve the community. Most of the respondents agreed 
that the institutions at kebele and wereda level are nonresponsive, weak, biased to the rich and 
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non-participative in nature. This could be attributed to the incapability of the local land 
governance and lack of experience of the land governance staffs working in the structure and 
specifically in the institutions at both kebele and wereda levels. For Example, the individuals 
who were working as a land judges and land administrators were elected from the community 
and were not capable enough to manage and judge the land related issues raised in the 
community as all of them were not beyond grade six. Besides, they lack the experience on how 
to deal with land issues as it is sometimes very complicated. Land governance needs the land 
judges and administrators to be familiar with some national and regional land policies, laws and 
regulations (FAO, 2007), whereas most of them did not had the knowledge, and even interest to 
know about the policies, laws and regulations. The land judges do not get any knowledge gap 
filling trainings except participating in an annual workshop which was conducted once in a year, 
they did not also get any payments for the service they render to the community. As a result, they 
were not motivated enough to work hard to serve the community. The same is true to the land 
administrators at kebele level. The community was also doubtful about the skill, knowledge and 
experience of the land judges and land administrators at kebele level.  
With all the limitations in their supporting role of the local government structures, the degree of 
reaching to poor and marginalized groups is also an important one. 
 
Source: own computation from survey data, 2013 
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Fig. 4.7: Land Governance Structures and Institutions 
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Evidence from the survey showed that, the structures and institutions degree of reaching the poor 
and marginalized was low. About 69(50.74%) and 34(25%) of respondents attested that the 
degree of reaching the poor and marginalized groups was very low and low respectively (Fig. 
4.7). Overall, it can be asserted that these structures did not have supportive nature to poor and 
marginalized groups. This may be of the reason that the finding that majorities disagree for the 
supportive nature of these structures to the poor and marginalized towards rural land conflict 
management. This may break the relationship of the local land governance structure and its 
institutions with the community as the poor and the marginalized groups are part of the 
community though their quantity could be relatively few. However, from the survey, it was 
found that the number of women headed respondents is about 46, where it is impossible to 
disregard this quantity. The evidence found from the survey also supports the finding that the 
relationship between local institutions and the community was low.   
 
Source: own computation from survey data, 2013 
From fig. 4.8, about 43 percent and 28 percent of the respondents revealed that the relationship 
between the local institutions and the community was very weak and weak respectively. This 
may be due to the weak structure and institutions equipped with unskilled, inexperienced and 
less motivated staffs that could not be able to enhance the relationship.  
Very weak፣ 58፣ 
43% 
weak፣ 38፣ 28% 
Fair፣ 36፣ 26% 
Good ፣ 4፣ 3% 
Fig. 4.8: Relationship Between Local Institutions 
and the Community  
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Besides to the relationship of the local governance structures and institutions with the 
community, knowing the existing status of the structures and institutions is vital on assessing the 
local land governance at the community level. 
Table 4.17: The Status of Local Government Structures and Institutions 
Criteria  Frequencies Total 
 Strongly 
disagree  
Disagree  Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
 
Weak 0 7 30 87 12 136 
Ineffective 0 3 13 74 46 136 
Non responsive 0 14 20 68 34 136 
Corrupt 0 5 31 73 27 136 
Do not encourage participation 0 9 27 64 36 136 
Not transparent 0 15 21 58 42 136 
Biased to the rich 0 19 17 61 39 136 
Not all inclusive (the poor and 
marginalized) in terms of 
representation 
0 12 20 76 28 136 
       
 Source: own computation from survey data, 2013 
Thus, as can be seen from table 4.17, about 99, 120, 102, 100, 100, 100, 100, and 104 
respondents respectively identified that the structure and institutions of the local government in 
terms of managing rural land conflict were weak, ineffective, non-responsive, corrupt, not 
encouraging for participation, not transparent, biased towards rich, and highly discriminating the 
poor and marginalized groups of the community. 
The capacity and ethics of arbitrators is decisive besides to the degree of choice of the structures 
and institutions of local government. Thus, based on criteria of having good arbitration skills, 
adequacy of experience, having updated themselves, willingness and respect to support 
conflicting parties, the commitment they have, having a belief to customary solution, and strong 
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believe in participation and representation of the poor, it was found that the respondents did not 
have a confidence on arbitrators because they lack the above qualities of arbitration during 
managing rural land conflicts. Based on the evidence collected, those arbitrators lack skill and 
were not motivated.  
Table 4.18: Attitudes and Skills of Arbitrators in Managing Rural Land Conflict 
Criteria  Frequencies Total 
   
 Strongly 
disagree  
Disagree  Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
They have good arbitration skills 0 61 58 17 0 136 
They have adequate experience 6 72 48 10 0 136 
Update themselves through formal 
and informal trainings 
80 52 4 0 0 136 
They are willing and respectful to 
support the conflicting parties 
0 80 42 14 0 136 
They have the energy and 
commitment 
46 82 8 0 0 136 
Believes in local customary solution 
than the legal one 
0 46 50 40 0 136 
Strongly believes in participation 
and representation of the poor and 
marginalized 
52 84 0 0 0 136 
       
Source: own computation from survey data, 2013 
 
4.7. Challenges of Local Land Governance in Conflict Management 
There were many challenges regarding local land governance. As a result, it was found that 
unclear land entitlement procedures, gap in enforcement of the law, unclear government land 
provision schemes, Capacity and experience of individuals in the land governance at local level, 
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and Low coverage of government structures and institutions were the five major challenges of 
land governance raised by the focus group discussants. 
 
Source: own computation from survey data, 2013 
The unclear land entitlement procedure was the challenge ranked first by the discussants. This 
was because land redistribution on 1990s was based on the emotional attachments and interests 
of the individuals who were redistributing the land at that time. These days, it is a headache for 
the land judges to call the then land redistributors as a witness for many of the land cases filed at 
kebele level. This clearly shows that, there were many unclear land entitlements with regard to 
the redistribution method of that time. The others challenges of land governance at local level 
were also listed according to their rank order. 
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Fig 4.9: The Major Challenges of Land Governance 
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Chapter Five: Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations 
5.1. Summary and Conclusion 
The study, which dealt with the local governance in rural land conflict management, was used to 
employ both qualitative and quantitative approaches to come up with key findings. Moreover, 
this study was based on a sample of four kebeles found in the Ganta Afeshum Wereda of Eastern 
zone. Purposive sampling was used to select the 136 respondents who had experienced conflicts 
in the last two years. Accordingly, the following conclusions have been drawn from the findings.  
It was found that most of the rural land conflicts raised at local level were managed formally, 
though the preference of the community was the informal method of conflict management. This 
may be due to the advantage it had over its counterpart of the formal system in terms of time, 
money, maintaining relationship of the litigants, and its superiority over creating win-win 
solutions.  
Nevertheless, conflicts stay more at kebele level when managed legally than at wereda or district 
level. The wereda court judges are more professional than their kebele counterparts. More land 
cases were first seen at kebele level and it increased the delay time exacerbated by the lack of 
motivation, capacity, and experience of kebele land administration and land judges. Besides, it 
was found that there were lots of bureaucracies, red tapes, corruptions, and biasedness in the 
system.  
The study also revealed that unclear land entitlement procedure was the first source of conflict. 
This unclear procedure may be originated from the lack of clear procedures, guidelines, policies 
towards rural land, and low implementation capacity of implementers. It could also be attributed 
to the biased distribution by the individuals who were selected to redistribute the land to the 
community in 1990s after the EPRDF government assumed power. This may create unclear 
demarcation of boundaries among neighbors that could lead to conflicts in the meantime. Thus, 
boundary conflict was found a frequently emerged type, even though the types of land conflict 
were different. 
For effectiveness of the structures and institutions of local land governance, transparency and 
accountability are key factors. Based on the factors used to measure transparency and 
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accountability the study revealed that both of them were found at their minimal level. On top of 
this, the local land governance structures and institutions were found weak in terms of coverage 
and capability to reach and serve the poor and marginalized group.  This might increase the 
ineffectiveness of those structures and institutions worsening the prevailed land inequality and 
livelihood instability. The personnel working in the structures and institutions of the local land 
governance were also found that they lack knowledge, experience, and motivation to know about 
the policies, laws and regulations of land.  
It was expected that the source of rural land conflict could be the challenges of the local land 
governance.  Of the challenges the study had revealed, unclear land entitlement procedures were 
identified as the most challenging.   This was because land redistribution on 1990s was based on 
the emotional attachments and interests of the individuals who were redistributing the land at that 
time. Gap in enforcement of the law, unclear government land provision schemes, capacity and 
experience of individuals in the land governance at local level, and low coverage of government 
structures and institutions were also other challenges found by the study.  
5.2. Recommendations 
Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations are made: 
 As it was found, the governance structures are weak and biased. Thus, a measure should 
be taken to correct these weaknesses. Government should strengthen these structures and 
institutions via increasing the coverage towards poor and marginalized groups, 
empowering local land governance by providing trainings, enhancing participations, and 
inclusiveness. At national and regional level, the local land governance stakeholders 
should support the existing structures and institutions by formulating supportive and 
legally binding policies and procedures to enhance the effectiveness of the whole land 
governance structures and institutions in improving the livelihood of community. 
 The previous land appropriation mechanisms lack efficiency and effectiveness. As a 
result, there are many conflicts that are raised out of the unclear and biased land 
appropriation. The land redistribution mechanism was not supported by technology and 
was not demarcated clearly. Hence, the redistribution should be supported by GIS to 
demarcate clearly and make each boundary easily understandable. The regional 
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government should also revise the unfair redistribution prevailed in the community. It 
will help to take inventories and redistribute the rural land to the needy of who most are 
youngsters. It is only through the land redistribution that we can know and redistribute to 
the needy if there is any beyond the quota or holding of every rural community who owns 
the land. This should be supported by a framework and procedures so that the local 
government is in charge to implement the framework. 
 The study indicated that most of the land conflicts were settled legally albeit respondents 
were in favor of the informal one. Hence, the legal method should accredit the customary 
way of conflict management in the litigation process as its main input provider. So that, 
these customary institutions should first see the cases, and if it is beyond their capacity, 
they submit it to the formal institutions in charge by attaching their recommendations, in 
our case to the kebele land judges and the wereda court. Any case that is not first 
submitted to the customary institution and seen by it should not be directly filed at the 
legal institutions. This mainly reduces the time and resource wastage besides to the 
maintenance of relationship of litigants. However, this should be backed by the national 
and regional governments through a policy framework that enables to establish a policy 
and set a framework. The local government and people should also strengthen their role 
at re-establishing the informal court.  
 Though there are more delays in conflict management at kebele level, there are also 
delays at wereda level. This is mainly attributed to the experience and knowledge gaps of 
the wereda court judges in relation to the diverse local contexts. Therefore, special courts 
who only oversee land conflicts are very important in this regard. This special court 
should be equipped with competent professionals having the knowledge of land 
governance policies, regulations and procedures, and the experience of the diverse local 
context. Hence, either the local government should empower the wereda court to enable 
them grasp the knowledge of the diverse local contexts of the rural community or the 
national and/or regional government should set a policy framework to establish a special 
court. The local government could establish this special court accordingly. 
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Appendix I 
Mekelle University 
College of Business and Economics 
Department of Management 
(Development Studies) 
Questionnaires to be filled by sample household heads. 
Dear Respondents: 
This survey is going to be undertaken by a student of Mekelle University, College of Business & 
Economics in the Department of Management in Partial Fulfillment for the Requirement of 
Master of Arts Degree in Development Studies (Governance, Democracy and Development 
Specialization). This questionnaire is designed to obtain information on Local Governance in 
Rural Land Conflict Management in Tigray: The Case of Ganta Afeshum wereda, Eastern Zone 
of Tigray. The information collected from you will be used for academic purposes, and will be 
kept confidentially.  
I thank you for your cooperation and time! 
Instruction: Please circle the appropriate answer and check the box of your choice, or 
code to all alternatives under each question below and use the space provided for open 
ended questions for further explanation. Your genuine response is critically invaluable 
for the better result of the study. Please read all the questions properly and provide your 
response. 
Part I: Demographic factors 
 Age___________________________ 
 Sex  
                            Male                    Female 
 Marital status 
                            Single                  Married                    Divorced                  widowed 
 House hold type 
                  Male Headed                         Female Headed 
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 Educational level of the respondent 
               Illiterate                                                           Secondary Education (Grade 9-12) 
Read and write only                                             Diploma 
              Primary Education (Grade 1-8)                          First Degree and above 
 
 Educational level of the House Hold Head 
     Illiterate                                    Primary Education                      Diploma 
 
    Read and write only                  Secondary education                   First degree and above 
 
 House hold size 
Three and less                         4 to 6                             7 to 10                  11 and above                           
 
 Main Source of livelihood 
 
Farming   
Livestock  
Irrigation   
      Please explain if your main source of income is other than the above lists   
    _____________________________________________________________        
 House hold’s Agricultural land per hectare     
   Less than 0.5               0.5 to 1.0            1.01 to 1.5            1.51 to 2.0           more than 2.0        
 Annual average income of the House Hold (in birr) 
                5000 and less                      5001 to 10000                               10001to 15000        
               15001 to 20,000                  20,001 to 25000                             25001 and above          
 
 Land entitlement status 
              Not yet                   Already Received  
 Number of land conflicts faced for the last two years since 2011 
 
One                 two                   Three               Four and above 
 When was the conflict occurred 
2011                             2012 
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 Status of settlement of conflicts 
Not settled yet                 partially settled                fully settled 
 
Part II: Main causes of rural land conflicts 
 Please select the main cause for the rural land conflict you faced and rank them 
accordingly 
Main causes  Rank 
Land Tenure insecurity  
Competing land claims and use as land value is increasing  
Land Holding inequalities  
Rural land scarcities  
Poverty  
Unclear land entitlement procedures  
Un clear procedures for inheritances including lineage  
Ineffectiveness of law enforcements  
Government land appropriation schemes  
 
Other causes if 
any___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Part III: Rural land conflict types 
 Please select the main types of conflicts you faced and rank them accordingly 
Type of conflict Rank Frequency 
Boundary Conflicts   
Inheritance conflicts   
Intra lineage conflicts   
Customary or Ancestral claims Vs. current use improvement 
claims 
  
Land conflicts as one manifestation of political differences   
Conflicts on vacated and absentee ownership of land   
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Other types of conflicts if 
any_____________________________________________________________ 
 
 Do you think that rural land conflicts equally affect women headed and men headed 
Households? 
                     Yes                                    No 
                If your answer is no, why_________________________________________________ 
 Which rural land conflict type is mostly faced by women headed households? 
                   ____________________________________________________________________ 
        Why_____________________________________________________________________ 
 Which rural land conflict type is mostly faced by the poor and marginalized? 
                        _________________________________________________________________ 
Why__________________________________________________________________ 
Part IV: Rural land conflict management at local level 
 Conflict is always negative in nature 
Yes                               No 
 If yes, why? _____________________________ 
 
 If No, why? _____________________________ 
 
 Who do you have faced a conflict with? 
                                         Neighbor 
                                         Family member 
                                        With someone in the community 
                                         If any other__________________________ 
 What is your choice of managing a conflict? 
                           Formal 
                                        Take the case to the Kebele Administrative committee 
                            Informal 
                                         Alternative conflict management mechanism 
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                                         Customary or Traditional conflict management 
                                         Mixed informal conflict management mechanisms 
 
 Please put a tick mark on your level of agreement on the following points why we choose 
formal or informal way of rural land conflict management 
 
formal/L
egal 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disa
gree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
Enforcement of a clearly and 
previously established rule of law 
     
Clearly defined penalty      
Professionalism of judges      
Impartial procedures      
There is no interest by the 
community to manage conflicts 
customarily 
     
Standardized procedure for 
determination, recording and 
dissemination of information 
     
Informal 
Judges lack knowledge about the 
rural land 
     
Judges are practically unfit to the 
diverse local conditions 
     
Legal procedures necessarily 
results in the recognition of 
“Loser” and “Winner”, which is 
not easily acceptable by the rural 
community and it invites for 
further revenge and conflict 
     
Sometimes, the impartiality of      
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courts is also questionable, in 
view of frequent accusations 
related to corruption practices 
with in the judiciary 
Courts and tribunals are 
overcrowded with land conflicts, 
a situation that reflects the limited 
effectiveness of the judicial 
system 
     
Justice is not accessible to the 
poor and marginalized due to 
costliness of courts, informal fees, 
long procedures, many 
bureaucratic red tapes and the 
coverage of courts 
     
Formal courts are not trusted by 
the villagers especially the poor 
and marginalized as courts are 
time consuming, biased to the 
rich, and judges need bribes 
     
 Judges decisions are not properly 
understood by the illiterate rural 
community, as a result they are 
not confident on the court to 
manage the conflict up to their 
expectations 
     
 Customary management of 
conflicts better secure rural 
stakeholders’ land entitlements 
     
 Customary conflict management 
is a consensus building way that 
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benefits both parties 
 
 Which way are you really using to manage the conflict raised? 
                   Formal               informal 
 Have you ever faced a delay in managing a rural land conflict? 
                     Yes                           no 
 If the answer for the above question is yes, on average, how long does it take to manage a 
rural land conflict customarily? 
 
Less than a year              1 to 2 years             2 to 3 Years              More than 3 years 
 
 
 On average, how long does it take to manage a rural land conflict legally? 
 
Less than a year            1 to 2 years            2 to 3 Years              More than 3 years 
 
 At what level do conflicts stay for longer period of time when managed legally? 
 
Kebele level                                  Wereda level 
 
 What do you think is the reason for the delayance? 
 
 
 What is the biggest challenge you faced during a legal rural land conflict management? 
Time               Money                Property                  relationship 
 
If any 
other________________________________________________________________ 
 
 What is the biggest challenge you faced during the customary rural land conflict 
management, if any? 
        
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 Do you think land entitlement is important in reducing rural land conflicts? 
                        Yes                                No 
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  If your answer for the above question is yes,  
Why? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Part V: Stakeholders of Local governance in rural land conflict management 
 Do you believe that the government is playing an important role in the local governance? 
Strongly disagree              Dis agree                neither disagree nor agree                  Agree 
               Strongly agree 
 Who are represented during customary rural land conflict management? 
_____________________                         _____________________________ 
               _____________________                          ______________________________ 
               ______________________                       ______________________________ 
 
 Are the poor and marginalized involved in any rural land conflict management? 
                  Yes                                       No 
            If your answer is yes, why______________________________________________ 
             If the answer is no, why _______________________________________________ 
 Is there any civic organization involved in the rural conflict management? 
                     Yes                                       No 
 If your answer is yes, please name______________________________________ 
 
 
 If your answer is No, what do you think is the reason? 
                   ______________________________________________________________ 
 How do you evaluate the capacity of the government staffs in rural land conflict 
management? 
Capable enough                                        not capable 
 How do you evaluate the experience of the government staffs at kebele level in rural land 
conflict management? 
                          Experienced                                     Not experienced  
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 How do you evaluate the corruption level the government staffs at wereda and kebele 
level in the legal conflict management frame work? 
                         Not Corrupted                                  I do not know                             Corrupted 
 To what extent do you agree about the transparency of the local government in rural land 
management? 
Activities strongly 
disagree 
disagree neither 
disagree 
nor 
agree 
agree strongly 
agree 
Land information is always available 
to the community 
     
There is open access to information 
about ownership, value and use of land 
     
There are standardized procedures for 
determination, recording and 
dissemination of information 
     
There is a supervision by the local 
authorities 
     
There is always a possibility of appeal      
 
 To what extent do you agree about the accountability of the local government in rural 
land management? 
Activities strongly 
disagree 
disagree neither 
disagree 
nor 
agree 
agree strongly 
agree 
The land governance institutions are 
responsive as demand arises from the 
community 
     
There are mechanisms for 
questioning and explaining the 
ongoing land activities in the 
community. 
     
The community is involved in every 
land related issues and have a say on 
it 
     
Kebele land administrators and land 
judges are elected by the community 
and could be fired by the community 
if necessary 
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Part VI: Local governance structures and institutions 
 Do you believe the local government structure is supportive in rural land conflict 
management? 
 
                              Yes                           No 
 
             If yes, why____________________________________________________________ 
 
If no, 
why____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 How do you evaluate the local coverage of institutions in terms of reaching the poor and 
marginalized? 
Very low                 low                      Fair                   Good                Very good  
 
 How do you see the relationship between the local institutions and the community? 
 
 Very weak                Weak                 Fair                   Good                     Very good  
 Do you think the formal land conflict management should consider the customary 
conflict resolution mechanisms? 
                                                Yes                          No 
               If yes,  
       Why? __________________________________________________________________ 
               If no, 
      Why? ___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 Please indicate your level of agreement on the local government structure and institutions 
 
The local government structure and 
institutions are for rural land 
conflict management 
Strongly 
disagree 
disagree Neither 
disagree 
nor agree 
agree Strongly 
agree 
Weak      
Ineffective      
Non responsive      
Corrupt      
Do not encourage participation      
Not transparent      
Biased to the rich      
Not all inclusive (the poor and      
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marginalized) in terms of 
representation 
 
Part VII: Attitudes and skills of Arbitrators in rural land conflict management 
Attitudes and skills of arbitrators in 
rural land conflict management 
Strongly 
disagree 
disagree Neither 
disagree 
nor agree 
agree Strongly 
agree 
They have good arbitration skills      
They have adequate experience      
Update themselves through formal and 
informal trainings 
     
They are willing and respectful to 
support the conflicting parties 
     
They have the energy and commitment      
Believes in local customary solution 
than the legal one 
     
Strongly believes in participation and 
representation of the poor and 
marginalized 
     
 
 What skill do you lack with the Arbitrators? 
 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
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Checklist for focus group discussion 
Part I: General instructions for the researcher 
 Make an acquaintance with the selected key communicators before starting discussion, by 
first introducing yourself to the member, i.e., your name, where you come from, and tell 
them the purpose and objective of the study so as to make things go smoothly and give 
thanks to them in advance before introducing the agendas. 
 Introduce the discussion points or agendas to your key communicators 
 Do not direct the key communicators; let them feel free to react openly in order to 
understand their feelings about the functioning of local governance in rural land conflict 
management, and then raise constructive opinions. 
 Write down each and every idea they raise up like a rapporteur does. 
Part II: General information 
 Name of the researcher: _________________ Date of focus group discussion: _____________ 
Part III:   Background about local land governance in rural land conflict management in  
Ganta Afeshum Wereda for the focus group discussants 
Local governance has its own roles in the rural land conflict management in in any local 
administrations. So, today we are going to discuss and see local governance in the rural land 
conflict management in your wereda, Ganta Afeshum. 
Part IV: Discussion points with the focus group 
Dear group members, you are from different sectors of the community. So, you, as a key 
community leaders or communicators, you have a great role to play in discussing the role of 
local governance in rural land conflict management in Ganta Afeshum wereda. Thus, please, 
discuss on the following key points such as: 
1. How land is governed at local level? 
 What are the institutions? 
 Who are directly involved? 
 Is the system of land governance participative? 
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2. What are the challenges of land governance at local level? 
3. What are the most common sources of rural land conflicts and the conflict types 
frequently observed in your kebele/wereda? 
4. What is the role of the local government in managing rural land conflicts in this wereda? 
5. How do you evaluate the structures and institutions of the government in rural land 
conflict management? 
6. What are the real gaps that the local government should feel to reduce rural land 
conflicts? 
7. What are your recommendations towards reducing rural land conflicts in Ganta Afeshum 
wereda? 
 
    Thank you for your cooperation in giving your opinions on the discussion points. 
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Semi structured Interview questions 
 Do you think land is a major governance issue? 
 Are the rules governing land allocation clear? 
 What are the major challenges of local land governance? 
 How do you see the role of local governance in rural land conflict management? 
 Who are the stakeholders in the formal and informal rural land conflict management? 
Legal 
Customary 
 What are the procedures used by the community to manage the rural land conflicts? 
Formal  
Informal 
 What are the local government structures in managing rural land conflicts? 
 Do you think the involvement of civic society organizations, the poor and women is very 
important? Why? 
 Are there any local institutions involved in rural land conflict management? 
 Do you think courts are providing an appropriate justice to the conflicting parties in 
solving the rural land conflicts? 
 
 Is there any corruption in rural land conflict management? At what level? 
Bribes 
Fraud 
Misuse of office power 
 Do you think the local government is transparent in rural land conflict management in 
terms of 
 Availability of land information 
 Open access to land information about ownership, value, and use of land 
 Standardized procedures for determination, recording and dissemination of 
information 
 Supervision and possibility of appeal 
 How do you see the importance of land entitlement in reducing rural land conflicts? 
